Shutze v. Credithrift of America, Inc. Case Brief
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Case Brief Summary & Legal Analysis
tl;dr: Shutze challenged Credithrift’s priority for a loan advance made after his judgment lien attached. The court upheld Credithrift’s priority under its earlier recorded future advance clause and left the foreclosure intact, but remanded to determine Shutze’s equitable rights in any remaining property value.
Legal Significance: A recorded future advance clause gives covered advances the original deed of trust’s priority despite an intervening judgment lien. Refinancing does not extinguish that security. A valid foreclosure may extinguish junior liens while leaving equitable claims requiring commercially reasonable valuation unresolved.
Case Facts & Court Holding
Key Facts & Case Background
The Gentrys borrowed $23,679.36 from Credithrift in 1981, securing the debt with a recorded second deed of trust on their residence. Its dragnet clause secured renewals and future advances until actual cancellation of record. Credithrift had no obligation to advance additional funds. Deposit Guaranty held the first mortgage.
The Gentrys refinanced with Credithrift in 1983. The 1981 deed of trust remained uncancelled. Shutze subsequently obtained a judgment against Hobart W. Gentry, Jr., for $4,541.78 and enrolled it on October 23, 1984. In August 1985, Credithrift again refinanced the debt and advanced $2,784.13 in new money, taking another deed of trust while retaining the original.
Credithrift foreclosed in July 1988 and purchased the property for $10,739.65, subject to the first mortgage’s $37,145 indebtedness. Credithrift later paid that indebtedness and acquired the first mortgage holder’s rights.
Shutze initiated proceedings to adjudicate the parties’ rights. The Chancery Court found Credithrift lacked actual knowledge of Shutze’s judgment when making the 1985 advance, upheld Credithrift’s priority, and held that foreclosure extinguished Shutze’s lien. Shutze appealed. Appraisal evidence suggested value exceeding the secured debts, but the Chancery Court made no property valuation finding.
Court Holding & Legal Precedent
Issue: Did Credithrift’s recorded 1981 dragnet clause give its 1985 renewal and advance priority over Shutze’s intervening judgment lien, and did the valid foreclosure dispose of Shutze’s equitable claim to remaining property value?
The court affirmed Credithrift’s lien priority and remanded for adjudication of Shutze’s equitable rights in the property’s remaining value. The uncancelled 1981 deed of trust secured the 1985 renewal and advance with its original priority. Credithrift’s lack of actual knowledge was unnecessary to that conclusion. The foreclosure price did not justify setting aside the sale, but the valid foreclosure did not resolve Shutze’s separate equitable claim.
IRAC Legal Analysis
Legal Issue
Did Credithrift’s recorded 1981 dragnet clause give its 1985 renewal and advance priority over Shutze’s intervening judgment lien, and did the valid foreclosure dispose of Shutze’s equitable claim to remaining property value?
Conclusion
The decision confirms original-recording priority for covered renewals and future advances while leaving application of the amended UCC rule to real estate undecided. It also preserves junior creditors’ equitable claims despite a valid foreclosure extinguishing their liens.
Legal Rule
A recorded mortgage sufficiently disclosing its future advance coverage gives advances within its terms priority over intervening claims; subsequent creditors must undertake diligent inquiry. Witczinski v. Everman, 51 Miss. 841, 846 (1876); Candler v. Cromwell, 101 Miss. 161, 171–72, 57 So. 554, 556 (1911). Covered renewals retain priority without discharge of the original security. Whiteway Finance Co., Inc. v. Green, 434 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Miss. 1983). A foreclosure sale is not set aside unless its price shocks the conscience or amounts to fraud, but commercial reasonableness separately protects junior creditors asserting equitable claims. Wansley v. First National Bank of Vicksburg, 566 So.2d 1218, 1224–25 (Miss. 1990); Builders Supply Company of Hattiesburg v. Pine Belt Savings Loan Assoc., 369 So.2d 743 (Miss. 1979).
Legal Analysis
The court distinguished enforceability between borrower and lender from priority against intervening creditors. The dragnet clause covered the Gentrys’ renewals and additional borrowing. Refinancing did not constitute full payment requiring cancellation under Sections 89-1-49 and 89-5-21, and taking additional deeds of trust did not impair the original security.
For the new advance, Witczinski and Candler established that covered advances receive the original mortgage’s priority. The court read Whiteway Finance as applying that principle against intervening recorded ownership rights. Because the 1981 instrument disclosed future advance coverage, Shutze was charged with knowledge and diligent inquiry. The court rejected North’s suggested obligatory-versus-voluntary distinction as unsupported by the earlier authorities and denied that North had overruled them. Credithrift’s lack of actual knowledge therefore did not supply the controlling rationale.
The court discussed applying amended UCC Section 75-9-301(4) by analogy to real estate but expressly declined to decide that question: Credithrift would prevail even under that provision because the Chancery Court found no actual knowledge of Shutze’s judgment. The majority also rejected the limitations objection because the final installment’s maturity could be inferred from the recorded terms.
The foreclosure’s validity presented a different question from Shutze’s entitlement to equity. Under Wansley, the effective purchase price did not shock the conscience. Under Builders Supply, however, commercial reasonableness also protects junior lien creditors. Shutze’s pleadings adequately raised that claim. Hearsay appraisals, absent valuation findings or evidence concerning any subsequent disposition, could not resolve it, requiring remand.
Separate opinions
Hawkins, dissenting: Joining Lee’s dissent, Hawkins additionally argued that Section 89-5-19 defeated Credithrift’s reliance on the 1981 deed of trust. Because the recorded instrument omitted installment due dates, he would apply the statutory deemed maturity date and conclude that enforcement was time-barred. Dan Lee concurred in the result only.
Lee, dissenting: Lee argued that repayment through successive new loans extinguished the earlier deeds of trust under Sections 89-1-49 and 89-5-21, leaving the 1985 security junior to Shutze’s judgment lien. He also disputed the parties’ intent to preserve earlier security, defended the optional-versus-obligatory distinction, treated North as displacing Witczinski, and rejected importing UCC rules into real estate law. He would reverse and enter judgment for Shutze on priority, then remand for further proceedings. Hawkins, Pittman, and McRae joined.
The Opinions
Summary
- A future advance made under a recorded deed of trust’s “dragnet clause” has priority over an intervening lien.
- The advance’s priority relates back to the original instrument’s recording date because it provides inquiry notice to subsequent creditors.
- A junior lienholder, though subordinate, has an equitable claim to surplus proceeds from a foreclosure sale if the property’s value exceeds the senior debt.
Full text
Complete unedited opinion text as published by the court
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 57
We affirm on this issue, although we remand for further proceedings on another.
The first of today's combatants is Credithrift of America, Inc. On April 8, 1981, the Gentrys negotiated a second mortgage, home equity loan with Credithrift, borrowing the sum of $23,679.36. The Gentrys executed and delivered a second deed of trust conveying a security interest in the 34th Avenue property to Ben Hendrix, trustee for the benefit of Credithrift, and this deed of trust was duly recorded in the land records of Forrest County, Mississippi. Of considerable consequence, this deed of trust contains a future advance clause, in legal colloquia sometimes a "dragnet clause," which reads as follows:
In addition to the indebtedness specifically mentioned above and any and all extensions or renewals of the same or any part thereof, this conveyance shall also cover such future and additional advances as may be made to the Grantor, or either of them, by the beneficiary. . . .
The clause went on to provide that the conveyance in trust secured
any and all debts, obligations, or liabilities, direct or contingent, of the grantor herein, or either of them, to the beneficiary, whether now existing or hereafter arising at any time before actual cancellation of this instrument on the public records of mortgages and deeds of trust, whether the same be evidenced by note, open account, overdraft, endorsement, guaranty or otherwise.
Nothing in any of the papers obligated Credithrift to make any future advances.
Over the next two years or so, the Gentrys made intermittent payments to Credithrift, reducing their indebtedness, and on July 12, 1983, refinanced the balance, giving a new note in the principal amount of $14,150.26, and a new (arguably superfluous) deed of trust. The original April 8, 1981, deed of trust, however, was not cancelled of record and, indeed, it is apparent *Page 58 Credithrift regarded the refinancing of July, 1983, as a "renewal of the . . . [original indebtedness]" pursuant to the dragnet clause of the April 8, 1981, deed of trust.
Enter Thomas E. Shutze, our other combatant. Shutze resides in Lamar County, Mississippi, and apparently had business dealings with the Gentrys, the nature of which is not disclosed in the record, nor is it important, except that on September 20, 1984, the County Court of Forrest County entered a judgment in favor of Shutze and against Hobart W. Gentry, Jr., in the original principal sum of $4,541.78. This judgment was duly enrolled in Forrest County on October 23, 1984, and its lien thereupon acquired the powers our law provides.
Re-enter Credithrift — eleven months later. By this time, the Gentrys had reduced their indebtedness to Credithrift to $11,215.13. On August 23, 1985, the Gentrys again refinanced — "renewed" — their loan with Credithrift and executed a new note in the principal sum of $14,150.26, repayable in installments at interest. The future advance — "the new money" — the Gentrys received was $2,784.13. Credithrift again regarded the renewal and advance as within the dragnet clause of the 1981 deed of trust which it in no way cancelled or released, although it did take the precaution of a new deed of trust.
Over the next several years, the Gentrys struggled financially. It appears they made their payments to Credithrift through the Spring of 1988. At some point thereafter, they abandoned all and left for the West Coast and are believed in Reseda, California. Their creditors immediately resorted to the 34th Avenue residence to satisfy their respective debts.
No one questions that Deposit Guaranty Mortgage Company held a good, valid and perfected first lien and security interest by virtue of its 1978 deed of trust. Second mortgage holder Credithrift and judgment lien creditor Shutze, however, litigated below regarding their respective rights, and particularly the priority thereof with regard to Credithrift's future advance of $2,784.13 made after Shutze perfected his judgment lien. It appears in the Summer of 1988, Credithrift appointed a substituted trustee under the original April 1, 1981, deed of trust and that on July 12, 1988, the trustee foreclosed on the Gentrys' property and sold it to Credithrift, the sole bidder, for the sum of $10,739.65, the amount of the Gentrys' indebtedness to Credithrift as of that day. The foreclosure, of course, was subject to Deposit Guaranty Mortgage's prior rights. Credithrift has since made its peace with the first mortgage holder, paying off its indebtedness and acquiring its rights.
The Chancery Court of Forrest County resolved the remaining controversy in favor of Credithrift. The Court first held that Credithrift's 1981 deed of trust contained a valid and enforceable dragnet clause securing all refinancing, renewals, and future advances and that this included the sums Credithrift advanced to the Gentrys on August 23, 1985. The Court acknowledged that Shutze had obtained a judgment against Hobart W. Gentry, Jr., on September 23, 1984, and that he had enrolled that judgment on October 23, 1984. The Court found, however, that at the time of the August, 1985, refinancing and advance to the Gentrys, Credithrift "had no actual notice of the plaintiff's [Shutze] judgment." On this basis, the Chancery Court held that Shutze's judgment lien was wholly junior and subordinate to the lien of Credithrift's 1981 deed of trust and, further, that Credithrift's foreclosure on July 12, 1988, extinguished Shutze's judgment lien vis-a-vis the 34th Avenue property. The Court in effect confirmed Credithrift's foreclosure and adjudged that Shutze take nothing.
Shutze now appeals to this Court.
We noted the practical rationale for such clauses in NewtonCounty Bank v. Jones,
Newton County Bank, 299 So.2d at 218. And so Whiteway FinanceCo., Inc. v. Green,When inserted in a deed of trust, such a clause operates as a convenience and an accommodation to . . . [borrowers]. It makes available additional funds without . . . [their] having to execute additional security documents, thereby saving time, travel, loan closing costs, costs of extra legal services, recording fees, et cetera.
There can be no question but that, vis-a-vis the Gentrys, the lien or security interest2 Credithrift held in the 34th Avenue residence secured all sums the Gentrys owed Credithrift through and including the 1985 refinancing, renewal and new advance.
The former point is easy. Insofar as the 1985 secured transaction between Credithrift and the Gentrys represented a renewal of sums outstanding under their prior secured loans, Credithrift is entitled to priority. It would be anomalous indeed to hold that a secured creditor loses his priority position when he refinances a debt such as this. See Whiteway Finance, 434 So.2d at 1353; Holland v. Bank of Lucedale, 204 So.2d at 877. It is true Miss. Code Ann. §
The more difficult question concerns the 1985 future advance of $2,784.13.5 Witczinski v. Everman,
A mortgage to secure future advances, which on its face gives information as to the extent and purpose of the contract, so that a purchaser or junior creditor may, by an inspection of the record, and by ordinary diligence and common prudence, ascertain the extent of the encumbrance, will prevail over the supervening claim of such purchaser or creditor as to all advances made by the mortgagee within the terms of such mortgage, whether made before or after the claim of such purchaser or creditor arose. [Emphasis supplied]
The Witczinski future advance clause was far less elaborate than Credithrift's but was nevertheless held
enough to show a contract that . . . is to stand as security . . . for such indebtedness as may arise from future dealings between the parties,
by reason of which the Court held it
Witczinski, 51 Miss. at 846.sufficient to put a purchaser or encumbrancer on inquiry, . . . .
This duty of inquiry beyond the face of the public record had been accepted earlier in Summers Brannin v. A. Roos Co.,
North v. J.W. McClintock, Inc.,
Nothing in North purports to overrule Witczinski and progeny. It does not so much as mention Candler. The Court makes a curious (and legally irrelevant) reference to its inability to find the Witczinski record. North, 208 Miss. at 300, 44 So.2d at 414. In a perceptive dissent, Justice Alexander takes the North Court to task for ignoring the rule settled inWitczinski and followed consistently for three quarters of a century.11
Whiteway Finance returns to first principles. Again, the question concerns the priority rights of a secured creditor making a future advance under a clause such as *Page 63
that here at issue vis-a-vis a third party who has, prior to the advance, acquired perfected rights in the property. InWhiteway the creditor had made a loan to Percy Lee Green in 1974. The loan was secured by certain real property via a deed of trust which contained a dragnet clause providing that it would secure future advances. Less than two years later, Green conveyed the property by warranty deed to his father, Washington Green, Jr., and this warranty deed was lodged of record and in law became notice to the world. Miss. Code Ann. §§
To be sure, the conveyance from Percy Lee Green to his father smacks of fraud, though the opinion neither makes nor proceeds on any assumption thereof. What we regard as important is the Court's treatment of the future advance — the money Whiteway loaned Green after he had conveyed the property to his father and had placed the deed of conveyance of public record. As between Percy Lee Green and Whiteway, the Court, of course, held the future advance clause enforceable and that the original deed of trust secured the $3,500.00 in new money. The Court then in so many words says this $3,500.00 lien had priority over the rights of Washington Green, Jr., notwithstanding the latter's perfected rights via the recorded warranty deed.12 Whiteway Finance, 434 So.2d at 1353.
The principle undergirding Whiteway is that, for priority purposes, the lien securing the future advance takes its date from the recording of the original deed of trust and by operation of law reaches forward to secure the advance made after intervening rights became perfected. The reason we permit this is the same we found in Witczinski and Summers Brannin almost 120 years ago and in Candler a generation later. Third parties dealing with the debtor — Washington Green, Jr., in Whiteway, Thomas E. Shutze in today's case — are given notice by the public record that the recorded lien secures any future advances. Those third parties are charged at their peril to inquire of the debtor and prior secured creditors. Candler, 101 Miss. at 172, 57 So. at 556; Witczinski, 51 Miss. at 846; Summers Brannin, 42 Miss. at 780. The device of a subordination agreement or notice to terminate13 may be available but, failing some legally effective contract or notice rearranging rank, third parties cannot be heard to complain when the original secured creditor's future advances are accorded the priority its publicly recorded instrument imports.
Nothing said here turns on the fact that in 1985, at the time of its last advance to the Gentrys, Credithrift had no actual knowledge of Shutze's judgment nor the lien thereof. We quite agree with the point Shutze stresses on appeal, that the Circuit Court erred when it held Credithrift prevailed by reason of its lack of actual knowledge.14 Shutze's enrolled judgment became notice to the world from and after October 23, 1984, and the fact that Credithrift did not know of it in no way affects Shutze's rights. Where Shutze fails is in his inability to see the Credithrift's lien was perfected three and a half years prior to his judgment lien and, by reason of the dragnet clause, Credithrift's lien reaches forward and secures the 1985 renewal and advance. Credithrift's dragnet clause had been a matter of public record since 1981, and under Witczinski and progeny would-be *Page 64 creditors such as Shutze were charged with knowledge thereof and with a duty of diligent inquiry regarding further details,before doing business with Gentry whether on open account or otherwise.15
All of this makes perfectly good sense in today's world. Our citizens and their secured creditors need the flexibility dragnet clauses provide. The demands of our agricultural credit economy are as great as in the days of Witczinski and Summers Brannin. Draws on construction loans and disbursements under lines of credit are other common examples of future advances businessmen need and secured lenders make. Second mortgage home equity loans are a more recent area of need. Many Mississippians need to borrow substantial sums with which to educate their offspring and to borrow by the semester as tuition payments become due. They and their lenders need the security of the knowledge that their priority position will remain fixed to the date of the original deed of trust or security agreement, so that they can save "time, travel, loan closing costs, costs of extra legal services, recording fees, et cetera," as in Newton CountyBank v. Jones, 299 So.2d at 218. There is no reason our law should demand new title searches incident to each advance. Any other view could imperil the student's education in mid-stream. The same may be said for opportunities our citizens pursue and in many other areas of social and economic life. The public records system each county maintains affords third parties full opportunity for knowledge which, if pursued with diligence, protects such third parties from being blind-sided.16 And because they will know we mean what we say, creditors do not have to record a new deed of trust every time a future advance is made which, if nothing else, avoids cluttering up the land records.
If we imported Section
The record reflects that in April of 1981, the Gentrys' 34th Avenue residence was appraised at $76,500.00. Apparently, prior to foreclosure, Credithrift engaged Homeland Titles Company to do a "quick sales appraisal" — an appraisal that contemplated having to sell the house within ninety days. The quick sales appraisal of the Gentrys' property was $60,000.00. Credithrift bought the property at foreclosure for $10,739.65. Because it bought subject to Deposit Guaranty's first mortgage indebtedness — $37,145.00 at the time — Credithrift in effect paid $47,884.00 for the property. Given these figures, one can readily see that, even if we accept the quick sales appraisal, there has been an equity left in the home from (the proceeds of) which Shutze's judgment might be satisfied.
Of course, none of this is sufficient to void the foreclosure, and a valid and effective foreclosure extinguishes all subordinate rights. The foreclosing trustee
People's Bank and Trust Co. v. L T. Developers, Inc.,has the exact same power to convey free and clear of junior liens or interests as though he held a deed absolute filed for record the day the deed of trust was recorded.
We have emphasized that *Page 66
this rule concerns only the legality of the foreclosure sale for purposes of vesting title to the collateral in the creditor or other purchaser at foreclosure. It has nothing whatsoever to do with the separate and distinct question of what, if any, deficiency judgment may be allowed.Wansley, 566 So.2d at 1224. Nor, as here, does it have to do with the separate and distinct rights of junior creditors who follow the proceeds of the sale and assert equitable claims. For purposes of deficiency judgment against the debtors, our cases have long recognized that the terms of foreclosure or other dispositions must be commercially reasonable and that, particularly where the foreclosing creditor buys at foreclosure, it must give the debtor fair credit for the commercially reasonable value of the collateral. Wansley, 566 So.2d at 1221-22, 1224-25. The same principle protects the rights of a junior lien creditor such as Thomas E. Shutze. Builders SupplyCompany of Hattiesburg v. Pine Belt Savings Loan Assoc.,
Shutze initiated this proceeding in the Chancery Court and asked inter alia that the Court adjudge "all of the rights and interests of the parties. . . ." Shutze asked further "for such other relief to which he may be entitled." In the present context, we find this sufficient to place before the Court the matter of Shutze's rights in the "equity" in the 34th Avenue property. Unfortunately, in the Court below these rights were not finally adjudged. The Chancery Court made no finding of fact of the value of the property at the time of foreclosure or at any other time. We have before us hearsay opinion evidence that in 1981 the property had a fair market value of $76,500.00. We have further hearsay evidence that at the time of foreclosure, the property had a quick sale value of $60,000.00. Nothing before us shows whether Credithrift has disposed of the property for a profit or a loss, nor whether such disposition may have been commercially reasonable, nor, for that matter, do we know whether Credithrift has disposed of the property at all.
All of this leaves us with the firm and definite conviction that there is unfinished business below. We remand this case to the Chancery Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN PART FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PRATHER, SULLIVAN and BANKS, JJ., concur.
HAWKINS, P.J., dissents with written opinion, joined by DAN M. LEE, P.J., in results only.
DAN M. LEE, P.J., dissents with separate opinion joined by HAWKINS, P.J., and PITTMAN and McRAE, JJ.
We reject the dissent theory in its entirety, but, if we were inclined to credit it so far as its logic may suggest, we would still affirm. Indulging a heavy dose of formalism, we see that Gentry's July 12, 1983, debt was incurred before his April 8, 1981, note was "paid." On July 12, 1983, in a technical sense, Credithrift loaned Gentry $14,150.26 which he only then used to pay the outstanding balance on the April 8, 1981, note. Thus, Gentry's 1983 debt was a "future or additional" debt within and secured by the 1981 deed of trust because it was formally and legally incurred before the 1981 note was paid. (The converse assumption would stand logic on its head.) The same holds for the 1985 future advance. The 1981 deed of trust having thus been kept alive and saved from extinguishment under Section
The deed of trust at bar provides for an aggregate installment debt of $23,679.36, incurred April 8, 1981, including add on interest at eighteen percent (18%) per annum, "Terms: 72 payments of $328.88 each" (from which one needs no special powers to know this probably means 72 monthly payments). The key (which Justice Hawkins omits from his dissenting opinion) is the interest rate: eighteen percent (18%) per annum. For one thing, from common usage we know installment notes like this are almost always payable monthly (as distinguished from weekly, semi-annually, etc.). Beyond this, we look at $23,679.76 payable in 72 installments of $328.88 each, including interest at 18%, and know intuitively this probably means for a six-year term, the 72 payment proviso being most suggestive.
Candor requires concession that precise mathematical calculation shows the intuitive mind in error — by one cent($.01) or .0011%, depending on your point of view. Starting with the three "givens" — (1) 72 payments of (2) $328.88 each for (3) a total indebtedness of $23,679.36 — a six year payout works only if the interest rate is 17.9989%. On the other hand, if we hold the interest rate of 18%, the last of the 72 payments must jump to $328.89, yielding Credithrift a windfall profit of one cent! [These calculations are made using the Truth In Lending Regulation Z Annual Percentage Rate Tables, 12 C.F.R. § 226, Appendices D and J.] Of course, we know in addition to all of this, the note was made April 8, 1981. From what appears from the face of the record, we may easily calculate with precision that the last installment is due on or about March 8, 1987. The statute of limitations then enforceable on written contracts including promissory notes was six years from the date the last payment was due, as Justice Hawkins points out. The six-year statute would expire March 8, 1993. Add the six-month grace period, and we readily see nothing in Section
§ 2.3 Priority of Future Advances
(a) If a mortgage secures future advances, all such advances have the priority of the original mortgage.
The point is explained in commentary and then illustrated with a case legally analogous to today's.
Comment:Restatement of the Law (Third), Property-Security (Mortgages) § 2.3, pp. 88, 90 (Tent. Dr. No. 1, March 22, 1991).Priority of future advances in general. This section recognizes that all future advances take the priority of the original mortgage. There is no distinction between advances that the mortgagee is contractually obligated to make and those that are option.
Illustration:
1. Mortgagor borrows $50,000 from Mortgagee, and executes a note and mortgage which state that future advances up to an additional $25,000 may be made by Mortgagee in the future. However, Mortgagee has no obligation to make such advances. The mortgage also states that it secures interest at 10% per annum and Mortgagee's attorneys' fees in any collection action. Thereafter J obtains a judgment against Mortgagor and properly records it so as to impose a lien on Mortgagor's real estate. Mortgagee has actual knowledge of this lien. Then Mortgagee lends and Mortgagor accepts an additional $25,000 advance. Mortgagor defaults on the loan, owing the full balance and $10,000 in interest. Mortgagee may recover in foreclosure the $75,000 balance, the $10,000 of interest, and Mortgagee's attorneys' fees to the extent permitted by local law. All of these items have priority over J's lien.
there are few, if any, future advance clauses which an astute judge cannot, at will, classify on one side or the other of the line between obligatory and voluntary.
2 Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 35.4, p. 930 (1965).
A person who becomes a lien creditor while a security interest is perfected takes subject to the security interest only to the extent that it secures advances made before he becomes a lien creditor or within forty-five (45) days thereafter or made without knowledge of the lien or pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of the lien.See Miss. Laws, ch. 343, § 1 (1986).
Section
(b) A recorded security interest takes priority as of the date of its recording as to advances or obligations thereafter made or incurred under the security agreement:(2) If not made pursuant to a commitment made before the secured party had knowledge of an intervening interest, to the extent of advances or obligations outstanding when the secured party obtained knowledge of the intervening interest and that do not exceed the maximum amount stated in the record; . . .
13 U.L.A. 590 (1986). Ten years later the NCCUSL promulgated a Uniform Land Security Interest Act, Section 302(c)(2) of which says the same thing. 7A U.L.A. 210 (1992 Supp.). If this were our rule, Credithrift would still prevail over Shutze.