Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois Case Brief

delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit was commenced on the 1st of March, 1883, in a Circuit Court of Illinois, by an information or bill in equity, filed by the Attorney General of the State, in the name of its people against the Illinois Central Railroad Company, a corporation created under its laws, and against the city of Chicago. The United States were also named as a party . defendant, but they never appeared in the suit, and it was impossible to bring them in as a party without their consent. The alleged grievances arose solely from the acts and claims of the railroad company, but the city of Chicago was made a defendant because of its interest in the subject of the litigation. The railroad company filed its answer in the state court at the first term after the commencement of the suit, and upon its petition the case was removed to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. In May following the city appeared to the suit and filed its answer, admitting all the allegations of fact in the" bill. A subsequent motion by the complainant to remand the case to the state court was denied. 16 Fed. Rep. 881. The pleadings were afterwards altered in various particulars. An • amended information or bill was filed by the Attorney General, and the city filed a cross-bill for affirmative relief against the State and the coippany. The latter appeared to the cross-bill and answered it,'as did the Attorney General for the State. Each party has. prosecuted a separate appeal.

The object of the suit is to obtain a judicial determination of the title of certain lands- on the east or lake front, of the city of Chicago, situated between the Chicago River and Six- ■ t'eenth street, which have been reclaimed from the waters of the lake, and are occupied by the tracks, depots, warehouses, piers arid other structures used by the railroad company in its business; and also óf the title claimed by the company to the submerged lands, constituting the bed of the lake, lying east of its tracks, within the corporate limits of the city, for the distance of a mile, and between the south line of the south pier near Chicago River extended eastwardly, and a line \*434extended, in ■ the same direction, from the south line of lot 21 near the company’s round-house and machine shops. The determination of the title of the company will involve a consideration of its fight to construct, for its- own business, as well as for public convenience, wharves, piers and docks in the harbor.

We agree with the court below that, to a clear understanding of ■ the numerous questions presented in this case, it was necessary to trace the history of the title to the several parcels of-land- claimed by the company. And the court, in its elaborate opinion, (33 Fed. Rep. 730,) for that purpose referred to the legislation of the United States and of the State, and to ordinances of the. city and proceedings thereunder, and stated, with great minuteness of detail, every material provision of law and every step taken. We have with great care gone over' the history detailed and are satisfied with its entire accuracy. It would, - therefore, serve no useful purpose to repeat what is, in our- opinion, clearly and fully narrated. In what' we may say of the rights of the -railroad company, of the State, arid of the city, remaining after the legislation and proceedings taken, we shall assume the correctness of that history.

The State of Illinois was admitted-into the Union in 1818 on an eqpal footing with the' original States in all respects. Such was one of the conditions of the cession from Virginia ■of the territory northwest of the Ohio Eiver, out of which the State was formed. But the equality prescribed would have existed if it had not been thus stipulated. There cari be no distinction between the several States of the Union in the character of the jurisdiction, sovereignty and dominion which they may possess and exercise^over persons and subjects within -their respective' limits. The boundaries of the State were prescribed by Congress and accepted by'the State in its original Constitution. They are given in the bill. It is sufficient for our purpose to observe that they include within their eastern line all that portion of Lajre Michigan lying east of the main land of the State and the middle of the lake south of latitude forty-two degrees and thirty minutes.

\*435It is the settled law of this country that the ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, within the limits of the several States, belong to the respective-States -within which they are found, with the consequent right to use or dispose of any portion thereof, when that can be done without substantial impairment, of the interest of the public in the waters, and subject always to the paramount right of Congress to control their navigation so far as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among the States. This doctrine has been often announced by this court,, and is not questipned by counsel of any of the parties. Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212; Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 18 Wall. 57.

The same doctrine is in this country held to be applicable to lands covered by fresh water in the Great Lakes over which is conducted an extended commerce with different States and foreign nations. These lakes possess all the general characteristics of open seas, except in the freshness of their waters, and in the absence of the ebb and flow of the tide. In other respects they are inland seas, and there is no reason or principle for the assertion of dominion and sovereignty over and ownership by the Stats' of lands covered by tide waters that is not equally applicable to its ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by. the fresh waters of these lakes. At one time the existence of tide waters was deemed essential in determining the admiralty jurisdiction of courts in England. That doctrine is now repudiated in this country as wholly inapplicable to our condition. In England the ebb and flow of the tide constitute the legal test of the navigability • of waters. There no waters are navigable in fact, at least to any great extent, which are not subject to the tide. There, as- said in the case of The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443, 455, “tjde.water and navigable water are synonymous terms, and tide water, with a few small and unimportant exceptions, meant nothing more than public rivers, as contradistinguished from private ones; ” and writers- on the subject of admiralty jurisdiction “took the ebb and flow of the tide as the test because it was a convenient one, and rriore easily determined \*436the character of the river. Hence the established doctrine in England, that the admiralty jurisdiction is confined to the ebb and flow of the tide. In other words, it is confined to public navigable waters.”

But in this, country the case is different. Some of our rivers are navigable for great distances above the flow of the tide; indeed, for hundreds of miles, by the largest vessels-used in commerce. As said in the case cited: “ There is certainly nothing in the ebb and flow of the tide that makes the waters peculiarly suitable for admiralty jurisdiction, nor anything in the absence of a tide that renders it unfit. If it is a public navigable water’, on which commerce is carried on between different States or nations, the reason for the jurisdiction is precisely the same. And if a distinction is made on that account, it is merely arbitrary, without any foundation in reason ; and, indeed, would seem to be inconsistent with it.”

The Great Lakes are not in any appreciable respect affected by the tide, and yet on their waters, as said above, a large commerce is carried on, exceeding in many instances the entire commerce of States on the borders of the sea. When the reason of the limitation of admiralty jurisdiction in England Was found inapplicable to the condition of navigable waters i,n this country, the limitation-and all its incidents were discarded. So also, by the common law, the doctrine of the dominion over and ownership by the crown of lands within the realm under tide waters is not founded upon the existence of the tide over the lands, but upon the fact that the waters are navigable, tide waters and navigable waters, as already said, being used as synonymous terms in England. The public being interested in the use of such waters, the possession by private individuals of lands under them could not be per-' mitted except by license of the crown, which could alone exercise such dominion over the waters as would insure freedom in their use so far as consistent with the public interest. The doctrine is founded upon the necessity of preserving to.. the, public the use of navigable waters from private interruption and encroachment, a reason as applicable, to navigable fresh watdSrs as to waters moved by the tide. We'hold, there\*437fore, that the same doctrine as to the dominion and sovereignty over and ownership of lands- under the' navigable waters of the Great Lakes applies, which obtains at the common law as to the dominion and sovereignty over and ownership of lands under tide waters on the borders of the sea, and that the lands are held by the same right in the one case as in the other, and subject to the same trusts and limitations. Upon that theory, we shall examine how far such dominion, sovereignty and proprietary right have been encroached upon by the railroad company, and how far that company had, at the time, the assent of the State to such encroachment, and also the validity of the claim which the company-asserts of a right to make further encroachments thereon by virtue of a grant from the State in April, 1869.

The city of Chicago is situated upon the southwestern shore of Lake Michigan, and includes,-'-with other territory,- fractional sections 10 and 15, in township 39 north, range 11 east of the third principal meridian, bordering on the lake, which forms their eastern boundary. Lor,- a long time' after the organization of the city its harbor'was the Chicago Liver, a small, narrow stream opening into the lake near the centre of the east and west line of section 10, and in it the shipping ■ arriving from other ports of the lake and navigable waters was moored or anchored, and along it were docks and wharves. The growth of the- city in subsequent years in population, business and commerce required a larger and more convenient harbor, and the United States, .in view of such expansion and growth, commenced the construction of a system of breakwaters and other harbor protections in the waters of the lake in front of the fractional sections mentioned. In the prosecution of this work there was constructed a line of breakwaters or cribs of wood and stone covering the front of the city between the Chicago Liver and Twelfth street, with openings in the piers- or lines of cribs for the entrance and departure of vessels, thus enclosing a largo, part of the lake for the uses of shipping and commerce; and creating an outer harbor for Chicago. It comprises a space about one mile and one-half in length from north to south, and-\*438is of a width from east to west varying from, one thousand to four thousand feet. As commerce and shipping expand, the harbor will be further extended towards the south, and, as alleged by the amended bill, it is expected that the necessities of commerce will soon require its enlargement so as to include a great part of the entire lake front of the city. It is stated, and not denied, that the authorities of the United States have in a general way indicated' a plan for the improvement and use of the harbor which has been enclosed as mentioned, by which a portion is devoted as a harbor of refuge where ships may ride at anchor with security and within protecting walls, and another portion of such enclosure nearer the shore of the lake may be devoted to wharves and piers, alongside of which ships may load and unload and upon which warehouses may be constructed and other structures er.ected for the convenience of lake commerce. •

The case proceeds upon the-theory and allegation that t.he-defendant, the Illinois Central Railroad Company, has, without lawful authority,- encroached,, and continues to encroach, ■upon the domain of the State, and its original ownership and control of the waters of the harbor and of the lands there-' under, upon a claim of rights acquired under'a grant from the State and ordinance of the city to enter the city and appropriate land and -water two hundred feet wide in order to construct a track for a railway, and to erect thereon warehouses, piers and other structures in front of the city, and upon a claim of riparian rights acquired by virtue of ownership of lands- originally bordering on the lake in front of the citv. It also proceeds against the claim asserted by the railroad company of a grant by the State, iml869, of its right and title to the submerged lands, constituting the bed of Lake Michigan lying east of the tracks and breakwater of the company, for the distance of one mile, and between the south line of the south pier extended eastwardly and a line extended in the same direction from the south line of lot twenty-one south of and near.the machine shops and round-house, of the company ; and of a right thereby to construct at its pleasure^ in the harbor, wharves, piers and other works for its use.

\*439The State'prays a decree establishing and confirming its title to the bed of Lake Michigan and exclusive right to develop and impróye the harbor of Chicago by the construction of docks, wharves,- piers and other improvements, against the claim of the railroad company,, that it has an absolute title to such submerged lands by the act of 1869, and the right, subject only to the paramount authority of the United States in the regulation of " commerce, to fill all the bed of the lake within the limits above stated, for the purpose of its business; and the right, by the construction and maintenance of wharves, docks .and piers, to improve the shore of the lake for the promotion generally of commerce and navigation. And the State, insisting that the company has, without .right, erected and proposes to continue to erect wharves and piers upon its domain, asks that such alleged unlawful structures may be ordered to be removed, and the company be enjoined from erecting further structures of any kind.

And first, as to lands in the harbor of Chicago possessed and used by the railroad company under the act of Congress of September 20, 1850, (9 Stat. 466, c. 61,) and the ordinance of the city of June 14, 1852. By that act Congress granted to the State of Illinois a right of way, not exceeding one hundred feet in width, on each side of its length, through the public lands, for the construction of a railroad from the southern terminus of the Illinois and Michigan Canal to a point at or near the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, with a branch to Chicago and another via the town of G-alena to a point opposite Dubuque in the State of Iowa, with the right to take the necessary materials for its construction. And, to aid in the construction of the railroad and branches, by the same act it granted to the State six alternate sections of land, designated by even numbers, on each side of the road and branches, with the usual reservation of any portion found to be sold by the .United States, or to which the right of preemption had attached at the time the route of the road and branches was definitely fixed, in which case provision was made for the selection of equivalent lands in contiguous sections.

\*440The lands granted were made subject to the disposition of the legislature of the State; and it was declared that the railroad and its branches should be and remain a public highway for the use of the government of the United States, free from toll or other charge upon the transportation of their property or troops.

The, act was formally accepted by the legislature of the State, February 17, 1851, (Laws of 1851, 192,193.) A few days before, and on the 10th of that month, the Illinois Central Eailroad Company was incorporated. It was invested generally with the powers, privileges, immunities and franchises of corporations, and specifically with the power of acquiring by purchase or otherwise, and of holding and conveying real and personal estate which might be needful to carry into effect fully the purposes of the act.

It was also authorized to survey, locate, construct and operate a railroad, with .one or more tracks or lines of rails, between the points designated and the branches mentioned. And it was declared that the company should'have a right of way upon, and might appropriate to its sole use and control, for the purposes contemplated, land not exceeding two hundred feet in width throughout its entire length; and might enter upon and take possession of and use any lands, streams and materials of every kind, for the location of depots and stopping stages, for the purpose of constructing bridges, dams, embankments, engine-houses, shops and other buildings necessary for completing, maintaining and operating the road. All such lands, waters, materials and privileges belonging to •the State were granted to the corporation for that purpose; and it was provided that, when owned by or belonging to any person, company or corporation, and they could not be obtained by voluntary, grant or release, the same might be taken and paid for by proceedings for condemnation as prescribed by law.

It was also enacted that nothing in the act should authorize the corporation to make a location of its road within any city without the consent of its common council. This consent was given by an ordinance of the common council of Chicago, \*441adopted. June 14, 1852. By its first section it granted permission to the company to lay down, construct and maintain within the limits of the city, and along the margin of the lake within and adjacent to the same, a railroad, with one or more tracks, and to operate the same with locomotive engines and cars, under such rules and regulations with reference to speed of trains, the receipt, safe-keeping and delivery of freight, and arrangements for the accommodation and conveyance of passengers, not inconsistent with the public safety, as the company might from time to time establish, and to have the right of way and all powers incident to and necessary therefor in the manner and upon the -following terms and conditions, namely, that the road should enter the city at or near the intersection of its then southern boundary with Lake Michigan; and follow the shore on or near the margin of the lake northerly to the southern bounds of the open space known as Lake Park, in front of canal section fifteen, and continue northerly across, the open space in front of that section to such grounds as the company might acquire between the north line of Randolph street and the Chicago River, in the Fort Dearborn addition, upon which grounds should be located the depot of the railroad company within the city, and such other buildings, slips or apparatus as might be necessary and convenient for its business. But it was understood, that the city did not undertake to obtain for the- company any right of way, or other right, privilege or easement, not then in its power to grant, or to assume any liability or responsibility for the acts of the company. It also declared that-the company might enter upon and use in perpetuity for its line of road- and other works necessary to protect the same from the lake, a width of three hundred feet from the southern boundary of the public ground near Twelfth street, to the northern line of Randolph street; the inner or west line of the ground to be not less than four hundred fee.t east from the west line of. Michigan Avenue, and parallel thereto; and it was authorized to extend its works and fill out into the lake to a point in.ihe southern pier not less than four hundred feet west from the then east end of the same, thence parallel with Michigan \*442Avenue to the north side of Randolph street, extended; but it was stated thaCthe common council did not grant any right.or privilege beyond the limits above specified, nor beyond the line that might be actually occupied by the works of the company.

Ey the ordinance the company was required^ to erect and maintain on the western or inner line of the ground pointed out for its main tracks on the lake shore such suitable walls, fences or other sufficient works as would prevent animals from straying upon or obstructing its tracks, and secure persons and property from danger; and to construct such suitable-gates at proper places at the ends of the streets, which were then or might thereafter be laid out, as required by the common council, to afford safe access to the lake; and provided that, in the case of the construction of an outside harbor, streets might be laid out to approach the same in the manner provided by law. The company was also required to erect and complete within three years after it should have accepted the ordinance, and forever thereafter maintain, a continuous wall or structure of stone masonry, pier-work or other sufficient material, of regular and sightly appearance, and not to exceed in height the general level of Michigan Avenue, opposite thereto, from the north side of Randolph street to the southern bound of Lake Park, at a distance of not more than three -hundred feet east from and parallel with the western.or inner line of the company, and continue the works to the southern boundary of the city, at such distance outside of the track of the road as might be expedient; which structure and works should be of sufficient strength and magnitude to protect .the entire front of the city, between the north line of Randolph street and its southern boundary, from further damage or injury from the .action of the waters of Lake'Michigan ; and that that part of the' structure south of Lake Park should be commenced and prosecuted with reasonable despatch after acceptance of the ordinance. It was also enacted that the company should “ not in any manner, nor for any purpose whatever, occupy, use or intrude upon the open ground known as ‘ Lake. Park,’ belonging to the city of Chicago, lying, between Michigan Avenue and the western or inner line before mentioned, except so far \*443as the common council may consent, for the convenience of said company, while constructing or repairing the works in front of said ground.” And it was declared that the company should “erect no buildings between the north line of Randolph street and the south side of the said Lake Park, nor occupy nor use the works proposed to be constructed between these points, except for the passage of or for making up or distributing their trains, nor place upon any part of their works between said points any obstruction to the view of the lake from the shore, nor suffer their locomotives, cars' or other articles to remain upon fheir tracks, but only erect such works as are proper for the construction of their necessary tracks and protection of the same.”

The company was allowed ninety days to ¿ccept this ordinance, and it was provided that upon such acceptance a contract embodying its provisions should be executed and delivered between the city and the company, and that the rights and privileges conferred upon the company should depend upon the performance on its part of the requirements made. The ordinance was accepted and the required agreement drawn and executed on the 28th of March, 1853. •

Tinder the authority of this ordinance the railroad company located its tracks within the corporate limits of the city. Those running northward from Twelfth street were.laid upon piling in tbe waters of the lake. The shore line of the lake was, at that time, at Park Row, about four hundred feet from the west line of Michigan Avenue, and at Randolph street about one hundred and twelve and a half feet. Since then the space between the shore line and the tracks of the railroad company has been filled with earth under the direction of the city and is now solid ground.

After the tracks were constructed the company erected -.a breakwater east of its roadway-upon a line parallel with .the west line of Michigan Avenue, and afterwards filled up the space between the breakwater and its tracks with earth and stone.

¥e do not deem it material, for the determination of any questions presented hr this case, to describe in detail, the extensive works of the railroad company under the permission given \*444to locate its road within, the city by the ordinance. It is sufficient to say that when this suit was commenced it had reclaimed from the waters of 'the lake a tract, two hundred feet in width, for the whole distance allowed for its entry within the city, and constructed thereon the tracks needed for its railway, with, all the guards against danger in its approach and crossings as specified in the ordinance, and erected the designated breakwater beyond its tracks on the east, and the necessary works for the protection of the shore on the west. Its works in no respect interfered with any useful freedom in the use of the waters of the lake for commerce, foreign, interstate or domestic. They were constructed under the authority of the law by the requirement of the city as a condition of its consent that the company might locate its road within its limits, and cannot be regarded as such an encroachment upon the domain of the State as to require- the interposition of the court for their removal or for any restraint in their use.

The railroad company never acquired by the reclamation from the waters of the lake of the land upon which its tracks are laid, or by the construction of the road and works connected therewith, an absolute fee in the- tract reclaimed, with a consequent right to dispose of the same to other parties, or to use it for any other -purpose than the one designated — the construction and operation of a railroad thereon with one or more, tracks and works in connection with the road or in aid thereof. The act incorporating the company only granted to it a right of way over the public lands for its use and control, for the purpose contemplated, which was to enable it to survey, locate, and construct and operate a railroad. All lands, waters, materials and privileges belonging to the • State were granted solely for that purpose. It did not contemplate, much less authorize, any diversion of the property to any other purpose. The use of it was restricted, to the purpose expressed. Whilst the grant to it included waters of streams in the line of the right of way belonging to the State, it was accompanied with a declaration that it should not be so construed as to authorize the corporation to interrupt the navigation of the streams. If the waters of the lake may be deemed to be included in the \*445designation of streams, then their use would be held equally restricted. The prohibition upon the company to make a location of its- road within any city, without the consent of its .common council, necessarily empowered that body to prescribe the conditions of the entry so far at least as to designate the place where it should be made, the character of the tracks to be laid, and the protection and guards that should be constructed to insure their safety. Nor did the railroad company acquire by the mere construction of its road and other works any rights as a riparian owner to reclaim still further lands from the. waters of the lake for its use, or the construction of piers, docks and wharvés in the furtherance of its business. The extent to which it could reclaim the land under the waters • was limited by the conditions- of the ordinance, which was simply for the construction of a railroad on a tract not to exceed a specified width, and of works connected therewith. ,

"We shall hereafter consider Avhat rights the company acquired as a riparian owner from its acquisition of title to lands bn the shore of the lake, but at present' we are speaking only of what rights it Acquired from the reclamation of- the tract upon which the railroad and the Avorks in connection with it'are built-. ' The construction of a pier or the' extension of any land into navigable waters for a railroad or other purposes, by one not the owner of lands on the shore, does not' give the builder of such pier or extension, whether, án individual or corporation, any riparian rights. Those rights are incident ' to riparian ownership. They exist with such ownership and pass with the transfer of the land. And the land must not only ' be contiguous to the water, but in contact with it. Proxiihity. without contact is insufficient. The riparian right attaches to land on the border of navigable water without any declaration to that effect from the'former owner, and its designation in a conveyance by him- Avould be surplusage.' (See Gould -on .Waters, § 148, and authorities there cited.)

•The .riparian proprietor is entitled, among other rights, as held in Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 504, to access to the navigable-part of the Avater on the front of which lies his land, and for that.purpose to make a landing, wharf or pier for his \*446own use or for the- use of the public, subject to such general rules and regulations as the legislature may prescribe for the protection of the rights of the public. In the case cited the court held that this riparian right was property and valuable; and though it must be enjoyed in due subjection to the rights of the public, it could not be arbitrarily or capriciously impaired. It had been held in the previous case of Dutton v. Strong, 1 Black, 23, 33, that whenever the water, of the shore Avas too shoal to be navigable, there was the same necessity for wharves, piers and landing places as in the bays and arms of the sea; that where that necessity existed, it was difficult to see any reason for denying to the adjacent owner the right to supply it; but that the right must be understood as terminating at the' point of navigability, where the necessity for such erections ordinarily ceased.

. In this case it appears that fractional section 10, Avhich was included within the city limits bordering on the lake front, was, many years before this suit was brought, divided,, under the authority of the United States, into blocks and lots, and the lots sold. The proceedings taken and the laws passed on the subject for the sale of the lots are stated Avith great particularity in the opinion of the court below, but for our purpose it is sufficient to mention that the lots laid out in fractional section 10 belonging to the United States were sold, and, either directly or from purchasers, the title to some of them fronting on the lake north of Randolph street became vested in the railroad company, and the company, finding the lake in front of those lots shallow, filled it in and upon the reclaimed land constructed slips, Avharves and piers, the last three piers in 1872, 1873, 1880, and 1881, which it claims to own and to have the right to use in its business.

According to the law of riparian ownership, which we have stated, this claim .is well founded so far as the piers do not extend beyond the.point of navigability in the waters of the lake. "We are not fully satisfied that such is the case from the evidence Avhich the company has produced, and the fact is not conceded. Nor does the court below find that such navigable point had been established by any public authority \*447or judicial decision, or thafc.it had any foundation other than the judgment of the railroad company.

The same position may\_be taken as to the claim of the company to the pier- and docks erected in front of Michigan Avenue between the lines of Twelfth and Sixteenth streets extended. The company had previously acquired the title to certain lots fronting on the lake at that point,, and, upon its claim of riparian rights from that ownership,'had erected the structures in question. Its ownership of them likewise depends upon the question whether they are extended beyond or are limited to the. navigable point of the watérs of the lake, of which, no satisfactory evidence was offered.

Upon the land reclaimed by the railroad company as riparian proprietor in front of lots into which section ten was divided, which it had purchased, its passenger depot was erected north of Randolph street, and, to facilitate its approach, the common council, by ordinance adopted September 10,1855, authorized it to curve' its tracks westwardly of the line fixed by the ordinance of. 1852, sq as to cross that line at a point not more than two hundred feet south of Randolph street, in accordance with a specified plan. This permission was given upon-the condition that the company should lay out upon its own land west of and alongside its passenger house a street fifty feet wide, extending from Water street to Randolph street, and fill 'the same up its entire length, within two years from the passage of the- ordinance. - The company’s tracks were curved as permitted, .the-street referred-to was opened, the required filling was done, and the street has ever since been used by the public. It being necessary that the railroad company should have additional means of approaching and using its station grounds between Randolph street, and the Chicago River, the. city, by another ordinance adopted September li>, 1856, granted it permission to enter and use, in perpetuity, for its line of; railroad and other works necessary to protect the same from.the lake, the space between its then breakwater and a line drawn from a point thereon seven hundred feet south of the north line of Randolph’ street extended, and running thence on a straight line to the. southeast corner of \*448its present breakwater, thence to the river; and the space thus indicated the railroad company occupied and continued to hold' pursuant to this ordinance, and we do not perceive any valid objection to its continued holding of the same for the purposes ' declared — that is, as additional means of approaching and using its station grounds.

We proceed to consider the claim of the railroad company to the ownership of submerged lands in the harbor, and the right to construct such wharves, piers, docks and other works therein as it may deem proper for its interest and business. ’The claim is founded upon the third section of the act of the legislature of the State passed, on the 16th of April, 1869, the material part of which is as follows:

“ Sec. 3. The right of the Illinois Central Eailroad Company under the grant from the State in its charter, which said grant constitutes a part of the consideration for which the said company pays to the State at least seven per cent of its gross earnings, and under and by virtue of its appropriation, occupancy, use and control, and the riparian ownership incident to such grant, appropriation, occupancy, use and control, in and to the lands submerged or otherwise lying east of the said line running parallel with and four hundred feet east of the west line. of Michigan Avenue, in .fractional sections ten and fifteen, township and range as aforesaid, is hereby confirmed; and all the right and title of the State of Illinois in and to the submerged lands constituting the bed of Lake Michigan, and lying east of the tracks and breakwater of the Illinois Central Eailroad Company, for the-distance of one mile, and; between the south line of the south pier extended eastwardly and a line extended eastward from the south line of lot twenty-one, south of and near to the round-house and machine shops of said company, in the south division 'of the said city of Chicago, are hereby granted in fee to the said Illinois Central Eailroad Company, its successors and assigns: provided, however, that the fee to said lands shall be held by said company in perpetuity, and that the said company shall not have power to grant, sell or convey the fee to the same; and that all gross receipts from use, profits, leases or otherwise of said lands, or the improvements \*449thereon, or that may hereafter be made thereon, shall form a part of the gross proceeds, receipts and income of the said 'Illinois Central Eailroad Company, upon which said company shall forever pay into the State treasury, semi-annually, the per centum provided for in its charter, in accordance with the requirements of said charter: and provided also, that nothing herein contained shall authorize obstructions to the Chicago harbor, or impair the public right of navigation; nor shall this act be construed to exempt the Illinois Central Eailroad Company, its lessees or assigns, from any act of the general assembly which may be hereafter passed regulating the rates of wharfage and dockage to be charged in said harbor.”

The act, of which this section is a part, was accepted by a resolution of the board of directors of the company at its office in the city of New York, July 6, 1870; but the acceptance was not communicated to the State until the 18th of November,' 1870. A copy of the resolution was on that day forwarded to the Secretary of State, and filed and recorded by him in the records of his office. On the 15th of April, 1873, the legislature of Illinois repealed the act. ■ The questions presented . relate to the validity of the section cited of the act and the effect of the repeal upon its operation.

The section in question has two objects in view: one was to confirm certain alleged rights of the railroad company under the grant from the State in its charter and under and “ by virtue of its appropriation, occupancy, use and control, and the riparian ownership incident ” thereto, in and to the lands submerged or otherwise lying east of a line parallel with and four hundred feet east of the west line of Michigan Avenue, in fráctional sections ten and fifteen. The other object was to grant to the railroad company submerged lands in the harbor.

The confirmation made,-whatever the operation claimed for it in other respects, cannot be invoked so as' to extend the riparian right which the company possessed, from its owner-' ship of lands in sections ten and fifteen on the shore of the lake. Whether the piers’ or docks constructed by it, after the passage of-the act of 1869, extend beyond the point of navigability in the waters of the lake, must be the subject of judicial \*450inquiry upon the execution of this decree in the court below: If it be ascertained upon such inquiry and determined that such piers and docks do not extend beyond, the point of practicable navigability, the claim of the railroad company to theip title and possession will be confirmed; but if they or either of them are found on such inquiry to extend beyond the point of such navigability, then the State will be entitled to a decree that they, or the one thus extended, be abated and removed to the extent shown, or for such other disposition of the extension as, upon the application of the State and the facts established, may be authorized by law.

As to the grant of the submerged lands, the act declares that all the right and title of the State in and to the submerged lands, constituting the bed of Lake. Michigan, and lying east of. the tracks and breakwater of the company for the distance of one mile, and between the south line of the south pier extended ' eastwardly. and a line extended eastwardly from the south line of' lot twenty-one, south of and near to the round-house and machine shops of the company “ are granted in fee to the railroad company, its successors and assigns.” The grant is accompanied with a proviso that the fee of the' lands shall be held by the company in perpetuity, and that it shall not have the power to grant, sell or convey the fee thereof. It also declares that nothing therein shall authorize obstructions to the harbor or impair the public right of navigation, or be construed to exempt the company from any act regulating the rates of wharfage and dockage to be charged in the harbor.

This clause is treated by the counsel of the company as an absolute conveyance to it of title to the submerged lands,'giving it as full and complete' power to use and dispose of the same, except in the technical transfer of the fee, in any manner it may choose, as if they were uplands, in no respect covered or affected by navigable waters, and not as a license to. use the lands subject to revocation by the State. Treating it as such a conveyance, its validity must be'determined by. the consideration whether the legislature was competent to make á grant of the kind.

The act, if valid and operative to the extent claimed, placed \*451under the control of the’railroad company nearly the whole of the submerged lands of' the harbor, subject only to the limitations that it should not authorize obstructions to the harbor or impair the public right of navigation, or exclude the legislature from regulating the rates of wharfage or dockage to be charged. With these limitations the act put it in the power of the company to delay indefinitely the improvement of the harbor, or to construct as many docks, piers and wharves and other works as it might choose, and at such positions in the harbor as might suit its purposes, and permit any kind of business to be conducted thereon, and to lease them out on its own terms, for indefinite periods. The inhibition against the technical transfer of the fee of any portion of the submerged lands was of little consequence when it. could make a lease for any period and renew it at its pleasure: And the inhibitions- against, authorizing obstructions to the harbor and impairing the public right of navigation placed no impediments upon the action of the railroad company which did not previously exist. A corporation-created for one purpose, the construction and operation of a railroad between designated points, is,- by the act, converted into a corporation to manage and practically control the harbor of Chicago, not simply for its own purpose as a railroád corporation, but for its own profit generally.

The circumstances attending the passage of the act through the legislature were on the hearing the subject of much .criticism. As originally introduced, the purpose of the act .was to enable the city of Chicago to enlarge its harbor and to grant to it the,title and interest of the State to. certain lands adjacent to the shore of Lake Michigan on the eastern front of the city, and-place the harbor under its control, giving it all the necessary powers for its wise management. But during the passage of- the act its purport was changed. Instead of providing for the cession of the submerged lands to the city, it provided for a cession of them to the railroad company. It was urged that the title of the act was not changed to correspond with its changed purpose, and an objection was taken to its validity on that account. But the majority of the court were of opinion that the evidence was insufficient to show that \*452the requirement of the constitution of the State, in its passage, was not complied with.

The question, therefore, to be considered is whether the legislature was competent to thus deprive the State of its ownership.of the submerged lands in the harbor of Chicago, and of the consequent control of its waters; or, in other words, whether the railroad corporation can hold the lands and control the waters by the grant, against any future exercise of póweV over them by the State.

That the State holds the title to the lands under the navigable waters of Lake Michigan, within its limits, in the same manner that the State holds title to soils under tide water, by the common law, we have already shown, and that title necessarily carries with it control- over the waters above them whenever the lands aré subjected to use. But it is a title different in character from that which the State holds in lands intended for sale. It is different from the title which the United States hold in the public lands which are open to preemption and sale.- It is a title held in trust for the people of the State that they may .enjoy the navigation of the watez’s, carry on coznmerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed, frozn the obstruction or interference' of private parties. The interest of the- people in the navigation of the watez’s and in commerce over them may be improved in many instances by the erection of wharves, docks and piers therein, for which purpose the. State may grant parcels of the submerged lands.; and, so long as their dispositiozi is made for such purpose, no valid Objections can be made to the grants. It is grants of parcels of lands under navigable waters, that may afford foundation -for wharves, piers, docks and other structures in aid of commerce, and grants of parcels which, being occupied, do not substantially impair the public interest in-the lands and waters remaining, that are chiefly considered and sustained in the adjudged cases as a valid exercise of legislative power consistently with thé tzmst to the public upon which such lands are held by the State. But that is a very diffez’ent doctrine from the one which would sanction the-abdication of the general control of the State over lands ujider the \*453navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a sea or lake. Such abdication is' not consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires the government of the State to preserve such waters for the use of the public. The trust devolving upon the State for the public, and which can only be discharged by the. management and control of property in which the public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property. The control of the State for the purposes of 'the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels ás are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, Or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining. It is only by observing the distinction between a grant of such parcels for the improvement of the public interest, or which when occupied do not substantially impair the public interest in the lands and waters remaining, and a grant of the whole property in which the public is interested, that the language of the adjudgéd cases can be reconciled. General language sometimes found in opinions of the courts, expressive of absolute ownership and control by the State of' lands under navigable waters, irrespective of any trust as to their use and disposition, must be read and construed with reference to ■ the special facts of the particular cases. A grant of all the lands under the navigable watefs of a State has never been adjudged-to be within the legislative power; and any attempted grant of the kind would be ■ held, if not absolutely void on its face, as subject to. revocation. The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties, .except in the instance of parcels mentioned for the improvement of the. navigation and use of the waters, or when parcels can be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains, than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace,' In the administration of government the use of such powers may for a limited period be delegated to a municipality or other body, but there always remains with the State the right to \*454revoke those powers and exercise them in a more direct manner* and one more conformable to its wishes. So with trusts connected with public property, or property of a special character, like lands under navigable waters, they cannot be placed entirely beyond the direction and control of the State.

The harbor of Chicago is of immense value to the people of the State „of Illinois in the facilities it affords to its vast and constantly increasing commerce; and the idea that its legislature can deprive the State of control over its bed and waters and place the same in the hands of a private corporation created for a different purpose, one limited to transportation of passengers and freight between distant points and the city, is a proposition that cannot be defended:

The area of the submerged lands proposed to be ceded by the act in question to the railroad .company embraces something more than a thousand acres, being, as stated by counsel, more than three times the area of the outer harbor, and not only including all of that harbor but embracing adjoining submerged lands which will, in all probability, be hereafter included in the harbor. It is as large as that embraced by all the merchandise docks along the-Thames at London; is much larger than that included .in the famous docks and.basins at Liverpoolis twice that of the port of Marseilles, atid nearly if not quite equal to the pier area along the water -frontlof the. city of New York. And the arrivals áh'd clearings of vessels at the port exceed in number those of New York, and; are equal to those of New York and Boston combined.- Chicago •- has nearly twenty-five per cent of the lake-carrying trade as’ compared’with the arrivals and clearings of all the leading ports of our great inland seas. In the year ending June 30, 1886, the joint arrivals and clearances of vessels at that port amounted to twenty-two' thousand and ninety-six, with a tonnage of over seven millions; and in 1890 the tonnage of the vessels reached nearly nine mili ions. As stated by counsel, since the passage of the Lake Front Act, in 1869, the population of the. city has increased nearly a million souls, and the increase of commerce has keo.t pace with it. It is hardly conceivable that the legislatuha'can divest the State, of the control \*455and management of this harbor and vest it absolutely in a private corporation.- Surely an act of the legislature transferring the title to its submerged lands and the power claiined by the railroad company, to a foreign State or nation would be repudiated, without hesitation, as a gross perversion of the trust over the property under which it is held. So would a similar transfer to a corporation of another State. It would not be listened to that the .control and management of the harbor of that great city — a subject of concern to the whole people of the State — should thus be placed elsewhere than in-the State itself. All the objections which can be urged to such attempted transfer may be urged to a transfer to a private corporation like the railroad company in this case.

Any grant of the kind is necessarily revocable, and the exercise of the trust by which the- property was held by the State can be resumed at any time. 'Undoubtedly there may be expenses incurred in improvements made under such a grant which the State ought to pay; but, be that as it may, the power to resume the trust whenever the State judges best is, we think, incontrovertible. The position advanced by the railroad company in support of its claim to'the ownership of the submerged lands and the right to the erection of wharves, piers and docks at its pleasure, or for its business in the harbor of Chicago, would place every harbor in the country at the mercy of a majority of the legislature of the State in which the harbor is situated.

We cannot, it'is true,- cite any authority where a grant of this kind has been held invalid, for we believe that no instance exists where the harbor of a great city and its commerce have been alio wed to pass, into the control of any private-corporation. But the decisions áre numerous which declare that such property is held by the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for the public?. The ownership of the navigable waters of the harbor and of the lands under them is a subject of public concern to the whole people of the State. The trust with which they are held, therefore, is governmental and-cannot be alienated, except in those instances mentioned of parcels used in the improvement of the interest thus held, or when parcels \*456can be disposed of without detriment to the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.

This' follows necessarily from the public character of the property, being held by the whole people for purposes in which the whole people are interested. As said by Chief .Justice Taney, in Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410: “ When the Revolution took place- the people of each State became themselves sovereign, and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the; soils under them, for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the general government.” In Arnold v. Mundy, 1 Halsted, 1, which is cited by this court in Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 418, and spoken of by Chief Justice Taney as entitled to -great weight, and in which the decision was made “ with great deliberation and research,” the Supreme Court-of New Jersey comments upon the rights of the State in the bed of navigable waters, and, after observing that the power exercised by the State over the lands and waters is nothing more than what is called the jus regivm, the right of. regulating, improving and securing them for the benefit of every individual citizen, adds: “The sovereign power, itself, therefore, cannot consistently with the principles of the law of nature and the constitution of a well-ordered society, make- a direct and absolute grant of the waters of the State, divesting all the citizens of their common right. It would be a grievance which never could be long borne by a free people.” Necessarily must the control 0‡ the waters of a State over' all- lands under them pass when the lands are conveyed in fee to private parties, and are by them subjected to use.

In the case of Stockton v. Baltimore and New York Railroad Company, 32 Fed. Rep. 9, 19, 20, which involved a consideration by Mr. Justice Bradley, late of this court, of the nature of the ownership by the State of lands under the navigable waters of the United States, he said:

“ It is insisted that the property of the State in lands under its navigable waters -is private property, and comes strictly, within the constitutional provision. It is significantly asked, \*457can the United States take the state house at Trenton, and the surrounding grounds belonging to the State, and appropriate them to the purposes of a railroad depot, or to any other use of the general government, without compensation? "We do not apprehend that the decision of the present case involves or requires a serious answer. to this question. ■ The cases are clearly not parallel. . The character of the title or ownership by which the State holds the state house is quite different from that by which it holds the land under the navigable waters in and around its territory. The information rightly states that, prior to the Revolution, the shore and lands under water of the navigable streams and waters of the province of New Jersey belonged to the King of Great Britain as part of the jura regalia of the crown, and devolved to the State by right of conquest. The information does not state, however, what is equally true, -that, after the conquest, the said lands 'were held by the State, as they were by the king, m trust for the public uses of navigation and fishery, and the erection thereon of wharves,, piers, light-houses, beacons' and other facilities of navigation and commerce. Being subject to this trust, they were publici juris ; in other words, they were held for the use of the people at large. It is true that to utilize the fisheries, especially, those of shell fish, it was necessarjr to parcel them out to particular operators, and employ the rent or consideration for the benefit of the whole people; but this did not alter the character of the title. The land remained subject to all other public uses as before, especially to those of navigation and commerce, which are always paramount to those of public fisheries. It is also true that portions of the submerged shoals and .flats, which really interfered with navigation, and could better subserve the purposes of commerce by being filled up and reclaimed, were disposed of to individuals for that purpose. But neither did these dispositions of useless parts affect the- character of the title to the remainder.”

Many other cases might be cited where it has been decided that the bed or soil of navigable waters is held by the people of the State in their character as sovereign in. trust for public* \*458uses for which they are adapted. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 220; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 394.

' In People v. New York amd Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N. Y. 71, 76, the Court of Appeals'of New York said :

“ The title to lands under' tide waters, within the realm of England, were, by the common law, deemed to be vested in the king as a public trust, to subserve and protect the public right to use them as common highways for commerce, trade, and intercourse. The king, by virtue of his proprietary interest could grant the soil so that it should become private property, but his grant was subject to the paramount right of public use of .navigable waters, which he could neither destroy nor abridge. In every such grant there was an implied reservation of the public right, and so far as it assumed to interfere with it, or to confer a right to impede or obstruct-navigation, or to make an exclusive appropriation of the use of navigable waters, the grant was void. In his treatise De J ure Maris (p. 22) Lord Hale says: ‘The jus privat/um that is acquired by the subject, either by patent or prescription, must not prejudice the jus publicum, wherewith public rivers and the arms of the sea are affected to public use; ’ and Mr. Justice Best, in Blundell v. Catterall, 5 B. & A. 268, in speaking of the subject, says: ‘ The soil can only be transferred subject to the public trust, and general usage shows that the public right has been excepted out of the grant of the soil.’ . . .

“The principle of the common law to which we Have adverted is founded upon the most obvious principles of public policy. The sea and navigable rivers are natural highways, and any obstruction to the common right, or exclusive appropriation of their use, is injurious to commerce, and if permitted at the will of the sovereign, would be very likely to end in materially crippling, if not destroying it. The laws of most nations have sedulously guarded the public use of navigable waters within, their limits against infringement, subjecting it only to such regulation by the State, in the interest of the public, as is deemed consistent with the preservation of the public right.”

\*459While the opinion of the New York court contains some expressions' which may require explanation when detached from the particular facts of that case, the general observations we cite are just and pertinent.

The soil under navigable waters being held by the people of the State in trust for the common úse and as a portion of their inherent sovereignty, any act of • legislation concerning their use affects the public welfare. If is, therefore, appropriately within the exercise of the pbliee power of the State.

In Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U. S. 548, it appeared that by an act passed by the legislature of Ohio, in 1846, it Was provided that upon the fulfilment of certain conditions by the proprietors or citizens of the town óf Canfield, the county seat should be permanently established in that town. Those conditions having been complied with, the county seat was' established therein accordingly. In 1874 the legislature passed an act for the removal of the county seat to another town. Certain citizens of Canfield thereupon filed their bill, setting forth the act ,of 1846, and claiming that the proceedings constituted an executed contract, and prayed for an injunction against the contemplated removal. But the court refused the injunction, holding that there could be no contract and no irrepealable law- upon governmental subjects, observing that legislatiVe acts concerning public interests are necessarily public laws; that every Succeeding legislature possesses the same jurisdiction and power as its predecessor; that thé latter have the same power of repeal and modification which the former had of enactment, neither more nor less; that all occupy in this respect a footing d'f perfect equality; that this is necessarily so in-the nature of things; that it is vital -to the public welfare that each one should be able, at all times, to do whatever the varying circumstances and present exigencies attending the subject may require;, and that a different result would be fraught with evil.

As counsel observe, if this is true doctrine as to the location of a county seat it is apparent that it-must apply with greater force to the control of the soils and beds of navigable waters; in the great public harbors. held' by the people in trusty for \*460their common use and of common right as an incident to their sovereignty. The legislature could not give away nor sell the discretion of its -successors in respect to matters, the government of. which, from the very nature of things, must vary writh varying circumstances. The legislation which may be needed one day for the harbor may be different from the legislation that may be required at another day. Every legislature must, at the time of its existence, exercise the power of the State in the execution of the trust devolved upon it. "We hold, therefore, that any attempted cession of the ownership and control of the State in and over the submerged lands in Lake Michigan, by the act'of April 16, 1869, was inoperative to affect, modify or in any respect to control the sovereignty and dominion of the State qver the lands, or its ownership thereof, and that any such attempted operation of the act was annulled by the repealing act of April 15:, 1873, which to that extent was valid and effective.' There.can be no irrepealable contract in a conveyance of property by a grantor in disregard of a public trust, under which he was bound to hold and .manage it.

The legislation of the State in the Lake Front Act, purporting to grant the fee of the submerged lands riientioned to the railroad company, was considered by the court below, in view of the preceding measures . taken for the .improvement of the harbor, and because further improvement in the same direction was contemplated, as a mere license to the company to prosecute such further improvement as an agency of the State, and that to this end the State had' placed certain of its resources at the command, of the company with such an enlargement of its powers and. privileges as enabled it to accomplish the objects in view.. And the court 'below, after observing that the act might be assumed as investing the- railroad company, with the power, not given In' its original charter, of erecting ' and maintaining wharves, docks ánd piers in the interest of commerce, and beyond the necessities or legitimate purposes of its own .business as a railroad corporation, added that it wa$ unable to perceive why it was not competent for the State; by subsequent legislation, to repeal.the act and withdraw the additional powers of the company, thereby restricting it to the \*461business for which it was incorporated, and to resume control of the resources and property which it had placed at the command of the company for the improvement'* of the harbor. The court, treating the act as a license to the company, also observed that it was deemed best, when that act was passed, for the public interest that the improvement of the harbor should be effected by the instrumentality .of. a railroad corporation interested, to some extent, in the accomplishment of that result, and said: “But if the.State subsequently determined, upon consideration of public policy, that this great work should not be entrusted to any railroad corporation, and that a corporation should, not be the owner of even- a qualified fee in the soil under the navigable waters of the harbor, no provision of- the national or State constitution forbade the general assembly of Illinois from giving effect,'by legislation,' to this change of policy. It cannot be claimed that the repeal óf the act of 1S69 took from the company a single right conferred upon it by its original charter. That act only granted additional powers and privileges for which the railroad com-' pany paid nothing, although, in consideration^ the grant of such additional powers and privileges, it agreed to pay a certain per centum of the gross proceeds, receipts, and incomes which it might -derive either from the lands granted by the act, or from any improvements erected thereon. But it was not absolutely bound, by anything contained in the act, to make use of the; submerged’ lands for the purposes contemplated by the legislature — certainly not within any given-time — and could not have been called upon to pay such per centum until after the', lands were used and improved, and income-derived therefrom. The repeal of the act relieved the corporation from any obligation to pay the per centum deferred to, because it had the effect to take from it the property from which alone the contemplated income could be derived. So' • that the effect of the act of 1813 was only to remit the railroad company to the exercise of -the powers, privileges and franchises granted in its original charter, and withdraw from-'it the additional powers given by the act of 1869 for the accomplishment of certain public objects.” If the act in question \*462be treated as a mere license to the company to make the improvement in the harbor contemplated as an agency of- the State, then we think the right to cancel the agency and revoke its power is unquestionable.

It remains to consider the, claim of the city of Chicago to portions of the east water front and how such claim, and the rights áttached to it, are interfered with by the railroad company.

'The claim of the city is to the ownership in fee of the streets, alleys, ways, commons and other public grounds on the east front of the city bordering "on the lake, as exhibited on the maps, showing the subdivision of fractional sections ten and -fifteen,' prepared under the supervision and direction of United States officers in the one case and by the canal comr' missioners in the other, and duly recorded* and the riparian rights attached to such ownership. - Ey a statute of- Illinois the making, acknowledging and recording of the plats operated to.vest the title to'the streets, alleys, ways and commons, and other public grounds designated on such plats, in the city, in trust for the public uses to which they were applicable. Canal Trustees v. Havens, 11 Illinois, 556; Chicago v. Rumsey, 87 Illinois, 354.

Such ■ property, besides other parcels, included the whole of that portion of fractional section fifteen which constitutes Michigan Avenue, and that part Of the fractional section lying •east of the- west line of Michigan Avenue, arid that portion of-fractional section tén designated on one of the plats as “public ground,” which was always to remain open and.free from any buildings.

." The estate, real and personal, held by the trustees' of the' town of Chicago was vested in the city of Chicago by the act of March 4, 1837. It followed that when the Lake Front Act of 1869 was passed the fee was in the city, subject to the public uses designated, of all the portions of section ten -and fifteen, particularly, described in the decree below. • And we agree with'the-court below that the fee. of the made or reclaimed ground between Randolph street and Park Row, embracing the ground upon which rest the tracks' and the \*463breakwater of the railroad company south of Randolph street, was in the city. The fact that the land which the *city had a right to fill in and appropriate by virtue of its ownership of the grounds in front of the lake had been filled in by the railroad company in the construction of the tracks for its railroad and for the breakwater on the shore west of it, did not deprive the city of its riparian rights. The exercise of those rights was only subject to the condition of the agreement with the city, under which the tracks and breakwater were constructed by the railroad company, and that was for a perpetual right of way over the .ground for its t-racks of railway, and, necessarily, the continuance of the breakwater as a protection of its works and the shore from the violence of the lake. With this reservation of the right of the railroad company to its use of the tracts on ground reclaimed by it and the continuance of the breakwater, the city possesses the same right. of riparian ownership, and is at full liberty to' exercise it, which it ever did.

. We also.agree with the court below that the city of Chicago, as riparian owner of the grounds on its east or lake front of the city, between the north line of Randolph street and the north line of block twenty-three, each of the lines being produced to Lake Michigan, and in virtue of authority conferred by its chartei*, has the power to construct and keep in, repair ,on the lake front, east of said premises,' within the lines mentioned, public landing places, wharves, docks and levees, subject, however, in the execution of that-power, to the authority of the State to prescribe the lines beyond which piers, docks, wharves and other structures, other than those erected by the general government, may not be extended into the navigable waters of the harbor, and to such supervision and control as. the United States may rightfully exercise.

It follows from the views expressed, and it is so declared and-adjudged, that the State of Illinois is the owner in fee of the submerged lands constituting the bed of Lake Michigan, which the third section of the act of Aprií 16, 1869, purported to grant to the Illinois Central Railroad Company, and that the' act of April 15, 1873, repealing the same is valid and effective \*464for the' purpose of restoring to the State the same control, dominion and ownership of said lands that it had prior to the passage of the act of'April 16, 1869.

But the decree- below, as it respects the pier commenced in 1872, and the piers completed in 1880 and 1881, marked 1, 2, and 3, néar Chicago River, and the pier and docks between and in front of Twelfth and Sixteenth streets, is modified so as to direct the.court belo.w to order such investigation to be made as may enable it- to determine- whether those piers erecte'd by the company, by virtue of its riparian proprietorship of lots formerly constituting part of section ten, extend into the lake beyond the point of practical navigability, having reference to the -manner in which commerce in vessels is conducted on the lake; and, if it be determined upon such investigation that said piers, or any of them, do not extend beyond such point, then that the title and possession of the railroad company to such piers shall be affirmed by the court ; but if it be ascertained and determined that such piers, or any’ of them, do extend beyond such navigable point, then the said court shall direct the said pier or piers, to the excess ascertained, to be abated and removed, or that other proceedings relating 'thereto be taken on the application of the State as may be authorized by law; and also to order that similar proceedings be taken to ascertain and determine whether or not the pier and dock, constructed, by the railroad company in front of the shore between Twelfth and Sixteenth' streets extend beyond the point of navigability, and to affirm the title and possession o-f the company if they do not extend beyond such point, and, if they do extend beyond such point, to order the abatement and removal of the excess, or that other' proceedings'relating thereto be taken on application of the State as may be authorized by law

Except as modified im, the particular.‘s 'menUonech, the decree im each of'the three cases on appeal must be afivrmed, with costs against the railroad company; and it is so ordered.