HOUSTON, Justice.
This is a dispute over mineral rights. The appellees, Willard McGee, Rachel McGee, and McGee, Ltd., a limited partnership, filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court of Lamar County against Peyton Greaves and the Lamar County Commission, seeking to establish their ownership of the minerals underlying a public road which crosses their land. The appellant, Greaves, counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment to establish his right to the minerals in question. The case was tried before the court, which found for the appellees. Lamar County has not appealed. We affirm.
The trial court made the following findings of fact:
The instrument referred to in the court's findings as Exhibit "A" reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
The dispositive issue in this case is whether the Yorks conveyed a fee simple interest in a strip of their land to Lamar County or simply a right of way across their land. If a fee simple interest was conveyed, then the judgment of the trial court would have to be reversed. The appellant would have the right to the minerals by virtue of his oil, gas, and mineral lease from Lamar County. If only a right of way was conveyed, then the judgment would have to be affirmed.
In Brashier v. Burkett,350 So.2d 309 (Ala.1977), the Court stated:
For the following reasons, we hold that the Yorks conveyed only a right of way to Lamar County and that right of way was for the express purpose of constructing and maintaining a public road.
Looking to the language of the instrument as a whole, it appears that the subject of the conveyance is "a right of way for [a] public road twenty feet in width." The instrument is replete with references to the limited purpose of the conveyance (i.e., to allow for the construction and maintenance of a public road across the Yorks' land). We disagree with the appellant's contention that the reference in the granting clause to a "strip of land" clearly establishes that the Yorks intended to convey a fee. When the intent to convey an easement is manifest, the employment of terms that would otherwise describe corporeal property only will not suffice to defeat the purpose of the grant or render the instrument void as a grant of an easement. The term "land" may, and often does, when consistent with the manifest intent of the parties as gleaned from the instrument as a whole, comprehend an easement as distinguished from a fee in the soil. Alabama Corn Mills Co. v. Mobile Docks Co., 200 Ala. 126, 75 So. 574 (1917).
Furthermore, the instrument recites that the "strip of land so conveyed [was] intended to be a strip through any [of the Yorks'] land that [the] road was [then] located on, or [might thereafter] be located on by Lamar County." An inference can be drawn from this language that the road in question was already under construction at the time of the conveyance and that the location for the remainder of the road to be constructed was to be discretionary with the county. The language, "may hereafter be located on by Lamar County" also gives rise to an inference that the road, once completed, was subject to future relocation anywhere on the York land at the discretion of the county.
The appellees argue that the uncertain description of the "strip of land" renders the instrument ineffective as a conveyance of a fee simple title as a matter of law. They further argue that such an uncertain description is indicative of the Yorks' intent to convey only a right of way.
The appellant insists that the instrument is effective as a conveyance of fee simple title, because the location of the strip is capable of ascertainment. He argues that it is where the road was located at that time or where it was eventually located and exists presently.
The trial court found that no evidence was presented at trial that the "strip of land" could be ascertained and determined to have a fixed and locatable boundary in and across the Yorks' land. It further found that the road had been moved and relocated on several occasions.
The "open" description contained in the instrument strongly implies that no conveyance of a fee was contemplated by the Yorks. Even assuming that the appellant had presented evidence at trial sufficiently establishing the road's location so that the instrument could possibly have been effective (at least as far as the description is concerned) to create a fee interest, it is not reasonable to infer that the Yorks would have intended such a result. Quite obviously, the Yorks were not certain at the time of the conveyance where the road would ultimately be located or relocated on their land. This kind of uncertainty is simply not consistent with an intent to convey a fee interest.
Looking to the subsequent actions of the parties, we find that Lamar County, in response to the appellees' request for admissions, admits that the York instrument conveyed to it only a right of way for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a public road. Judge Allen, Chairman of the Lamar County Commission, testified that the county had never claimed any interest in the minerals underlying the road.
The appellant relies principally upon Schneider v. Mobile County, 284 Ala. 304, 224 So.2d 657 (1969), and Rowell v. Gulf, M. & O. R.R., 248 Ala. 463, 28 So.2d 209 (1946), in support of his argument that the York instrument conveyed a fee. However, these cases are distinguishable from the present case.
In Schneider, the granting clauses of the two deeds in question were identical except for the cash consideration. They recited that for the stated consideration the grantors "have GRANTED, BARGAINED, SOLD, and by these presents do hereby GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL, and CONVEY unto the said Mobile County, Alabama, its heirs and assigns, the following described Real Estate situated in the county of Mobile and State of Alabama, to wit...." (Emphasis added.) The language quoted above was then followed in one of the questioned deeds by a description, which read in part as follows: "A strip of land, to be used as right of way for the Citronelle Road, 30 feet wide being 15 feet on each side of the following described line." The pertinent part of the description in the other deed read: "A strip of land 50 feet wide, to be used as right of way for the Citronelle Road, being 25 feet on each side of the following described line." (Emphasis added.)
Rowell also involved the construction of two deeds. The granting clauses of those deeds, except for the differences in the amount of cash consideration, were identical and recited that the grantors "for the further consideration of the benefits to accrue to us from the construction of a railroad on the strip of land and in the station ground herein conveyed, do grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company for right of way and station grounds that certain tract of land situated in Mobile County, Alabama, more particularly described as follows, to wit...." (Emphasis added.) After the description of the land, the deeds recited: "The station grounds and right of way herein conveyed and the tract of land herein described being according to a map and survey signed by J.E. Buck, C.E." (Emphasis added.)
In both Schneider and Rowell, the deeds in question affirmatively showed that a conveyance of specifically described land was made, accompanied by a recitation of the use to which that land was to be put, and the Court held that a fee simple title was conveyed to the land described.
In the present case, the granting clause, in pertinent part, recites that "W.C. York and wife ... for the further consideration that Lamar County ... shall locate and maintain a public highway ... through our land ... do hereby release, quitclaim, and convey to the County of Lamar ... for the use and purpose of maintaining a public highway, all of our right, title, interest and claim in and to the following strip of land twenty feet wide to be used for the purpose of constructing a road." This language is followed by a description which reads: "a right of way for public road twenty feet in width." This description is then followed by a description of the land through which the road was to run. Thus the reference to the "strip of land twenty feet wide to be used for the purpose of constructing a road" in the last line of the granting clause is to "a right of way for public road twenty feet in width" as set out in the description clause. The reference to the "following described real estate" in the last line of the granting clause is to the land described in the description clause through which the right of way was to run. When the granting and description clauses are considered together, it can be seen that the "strip of land" referred to in the last line of the granting clause is characterized in the description clause as a right of way.
As heretofore indicated, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.