Backpay discretion must serve Title VII’s deterrent and compensatory purposes. The Court distinguished Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968), which addressed attorneys’ fees, rather than adopting its special-circumstances approach to backpay. The statutory structure and legislative history instead required principled equitable discretion consistent with eliminating discrimination and restoring lost wages. An employer’s absence of bad faith does not diminish employees’ economic injuries.
Plaintiffs’ delayed and inconsistent demand presented a separate equitable question. Title VII imposed no legal bar to requesting backpay after filing or trial, but litigation conduct causing improper and substantial prejudice could justify denial. Whether prejudice existed and whether the conduct was excusable remained open on remand, subject to review for clearly erroneous findings and abuse of discretion.
Applying Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court gave great deference to the EEOC Guidelines. Albemarle’s study produced inconsistent correlations and lacked job analysis supporting extension to unstudied jobs. Supervisors used vague ranking criteria, preventing assessment of their relationship to job-specific ability. Correlations involving upper-level employees did not establish appropriate entry requirements without examining promotion speed, training, and alternative placement of testing. Differences between experienced incumbents and new applicants also undermined validation.
The Court recognized that plaintiffs could challenge even validated tests by identifying effective selection alternatives with less racial impact. Changing plant practices, newly clarified standards, and possible limited provisional testing warranted leaving the precise relief to the District Court.