Case brief · Criminal Law

KING v. STATE Case Brief

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama • 1987
Holding checked against the opinion
505 So.2d 403 Criminal Law Evidence
AI-generated from the opinion text. Read the opinion before you rely on it.

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Case Brief Summary & Legal Analysis

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tl;dr: King challenged whether shooting at an occupied car on an interstate showed extreme indifference to human life generally. The court affirmed his reckless-murder conviction because the evidence permitted the jury to find that his conduct gravely endangered both occupants and anyone else who might have been using that highway.

Legal Significance: The case applies the distinction between extreme indifference to human life generally and indifference directed solely at a particular person. Shooting at an occupied vehicle on an interstate supported reckless murder because the danger extended to both occupants and potential highway users.

Case Facts & Court Holding

Key Facts & Case Background

The State’s evidence showed that Christopher Doyle King and Reeves apparently bumped into each other and exchanged words at a nightclub. Later, King followed an automobile driven by Dunnaway, with Reeves in the passenger seat, onto an interstate highway. King tailgated the automobile for several miles while blinking his truck’s lights. Dunnaway repeatedly slowed to let him pass.

King then retrieved a .38-caliber pistol, pulled alongside the automobile on its right, and fired two or three shots before leaving the interstate. Bullets flattened the rear tires, and one pierced the passenger window and struck Reeves in the head. Reeves died several hours later. Neither occupant was armed or provoked the shooting.

Knight, King’s passenger, testified that King announced he would “mess with them and shoot the tires out.” King subsequently disposed of the pistol and gave conflicting accounts of the incident.

A jury convicted King of murder under count one of a two-count indictment. The trial court sentenced him to twenty years’ imprisonment and imposed a $1,000 fine payable to the Alabama Crime Victims Compensation Fund. King appealed, challenging only the sufficiency of the evidence of extreme indifference to human life generally. He preserved that issue through motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial, both of which were denied.

Court Holding & Legal Precedent

Issue: Was the State’s evidence that King fired at an occupied automobile on an interstate sufficient to establish extreme indifference to human life generally under § 13A-6-2(a)(2)?

The court affirmed King’s conviction and held that his motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial were properly denied. The evidence permitted the jury to find that firing at the automobile without excuse or provocation consciously disregarded a grave risk to both occupants and anyone else who might have been using that portion of the interstate, manifesting extreme indifference to human life generally.

IRAC Legal Analysis

Legal Issue

Was the State’s evidence that King fired at an occupied automobile on an interstate sufficient to establish extreme indifference to human life generally under § 13A-6-2(a)(2)?

Conclusion

The decision establishes that shooting at an occupied automobile on an interstate can support reckless murder when the circumstances demonstrate grave danger and extreme indifference to human life generally. Its application rests on the danger to both occupants and potential highway users.

Legal Rule

Reckless murder requires conduct creating a grave or very high risk of death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life generally, rather than to a particular person alone. § 13A-6-2(a)(2), Code of Alabama 1975; Ex parte McCormack, 431 So.2d 1340 (Ala.1983); Northington v. State, 413 So.2d 1169 (Ala.Cr.App.1981). Recklessness requires awareness and conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk whose disregard grossly deviates from reasonable conduct. § 13A-2-2(3). Sufficiency review considers the evidence in the prosecution’s favor and asks whether legal evidence permitted a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Cumbo v. State, 368 So.2d 871 (Ala.Cr.App.1978); Thomas v. State, 363 So.2d 1020 (Ala.Cr.App.1978); Willis v. State, 447 So.2d 199 (Ala.Cr.App.1983).

Legal Analysis

The court reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and asked whether the jury could reasonably find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Its task was to assess evidentiary sufficiency, rather than independently determine guilt.

Applying Northington and Ex parte McCormack, the court required extreme indifference to human life generally. It distinguished reckless murder from intentional murder: the charged offense rested on disregard of the risks attending King’s conduct, rather than a specific intent to kill a particular person. The circumstances also had to demonstrate shocking, outrageous, or specially heinous conduct.

King’s firing at a moving, occupied automobile without justification supported findings that he understood and consciously disregarded a very great risk of death. The risk extended beyond Reeves, with whom King had exchanged words, to Dunnaway and anyone else who might have been using that portion of the interstate. The opinion did not identify any additional highway users as actually present.

The court also discussed Hill v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 646, 40 S.W.2d 261 (1931), which upheld murder liability for unjustifiably firing at the tires of an occupied automobile and killing an occupant. That precedent supplied an analogous example of lethal danger from shooting at a vehicle.

Given the absence of provocation and the breadth and severity of the danger, the evidence supported both a gross deviation from reasonable conduct and extreme indifference to human life generally. The jury therefore had sufficient evidence to convict under § 13A-6-2(a)(2).

The Opinions

Summary

  • Firing a gun at an occupied vehicle on a public highway is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for reckless murder under Ala. Code § 13A-6-2(a)(2).
  • Such an act manifests “extreme indifference to human life in general” because it creates a grave risk of death to the driver, passengers, and other motorists, not just a single targeted individual.
  • This conduct qualifies as “depraved heart” murder.

Full text

Complete unedited opinion text as published by the court

PATTERSON, Judge.

PATTERSON, Judge.

Appellant, Christopher Doyle King, was indicted by a two-count indictment for murder in violation of § 13A-6-2, Code of Alabama 1975. Count one charged that appellant

Count two charged that appellant

The case was tried to a jury, and on October 3, 1985, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder, as charged in count one. The trial court sentenced appellant to twenty years in the penitentiary and fined him $1,000, payable to the Alabama Crime Victims Compensation Fund.

King appeals, raising one issue: "Whether or not the State of Alabama failed to prove that the appellant manifested extreme indifference to human life in general as required by Section 13A-6-2(a)(2) of the Alabama Code so as to support a conviction for reckless murder." This issue was properly preserved for our review by a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief and by motion for new trial, both of which were overruled.

The evidence presented by the State disclosed that on the evening of November 22, 1984, Dwight Lee Reeves and his cousin, Rodney Dunnaway, traveled from Fultondale to Birmingham to visit Trader Johns, a nightclub in east Birmingham. They traveled in Dunnaway's automobile. That same evening, appellant and a friend, Bobby Knight, visited the same club. They traveled in appellant's blue pickup truck. While at the club, appellant and Reeves apparently "bumped" into each other and exchanged words. Both were apparently upset by the encounter. Dunnaway and Reeves left the club around 1:30 a.m. to go home. Appellant and Knight left shortly before Dunnaway and Reeves. As Dunnaway and Reeves were pulling out of the parking lot of the club, a blue pickup truck pulled up closely behind Dunnaway's automobile and stopped for a short period. Dunnaway was driving, and Reeves was sitting on the passenger's side in the front seat of the automobile. Dunnaway drove away from the club, entered the interstate highway, and proceeded westward toward downtown Birmingham and Fultondale at a speed of approximately fifty-five miles per hour. Appellant and Knight left the parking lot of the club in the pickup truck, which appellant was driving, and after entering the interstate highway, proceeded westward in the same direction as Dunnaway was proceeding, and in the opposite direction from appellant's home. Appellant observed Dunnaway's automobile and recognized the passenger, Reeves, as the person with whom he had had the altercation at the club. Appellant drove his truck closely behind Dunnaway's automobile and, while blinking his truck's lights, "tailgated" it for several miles. Dunnaway reduced his speed several times to let the truck pass, but it continued closely behind him. As the vehicles approached the 31st Street exit, appellant pulled a .38-caliber pistol from under the seat of his truck, pulled up beside Dunnaway's automobile on the right side, fired two or three shots at the vehicle, and turned right on the off-ramp, leaving the interstate highway. Bullets struck the rear tires of Dunnaway's vehicle, causing them to immediately go flat, and the vehicle came to a halt some distance beyond the 31st Street exit. One bullet pierced the window on the passenger's side and struck Reeves in the head. He fell over into Dunnaway's lap. Reeves died from the head wound several hours later. Reeves and Dunnaway were unarmed and did nothing to provoke the shooting. Appellant went home immediately after the incident and did not report it. The police investigation ultimately led to his arrest some two months later. Appellant gave conflicting stories to several persons about the incident, and when arrested, falsely stated that he had no knowledge of the incident. He disposed of the pistol in a "dumpster," and it was never recovered. The State's case was primarily based upon the testimony of Dunnaway and Knight, and the testimony of each was essentially consistent with the other's.

Knight, testifying for the State, stated that, just before the incident, appellant stated that he was going to "mess with them and shoot the tires out." He further testified that, just after the shooting, appellant stated that he "might have messed up or he shot the window out." In substance, Knight testified that there was no provocation or excuse for appellant's actions.

This court interpreted the meaning of reckless homicide proscribed by § 13A-6-2(a)(2), in Northington v. State,413 So.2d 1169 (Ala.Cr.App.1981), cert. quashed, 413 So.2d 1172 (Ala.1982). Therein, we stated the following:

Id. at 1170-71. We also stated,

Id. at 1172. The Supreme Court of Alabama subsequently adopted this interpretation. Ex parte Washington,448 So.2d 404, 408 (Ala.1984); Ex parte McCormack,431 So.2d 1340 (Ala.1983).

In Ex parte Weems,463 So.2d 170, 172 (Ala.1984), the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Faulkner, stated the following:

We find in a discussion of "depraved heart murder" in LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, § 70 (1972), the following:

In Hill v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 646, 40 S.W.2d 261 (1931), the court held that one who intentionally fires into an automobile which he knows is occupied and who kills someone therein is guilty of murder. Hill involved a traffic policeman firing at the tires of an occupied automobile without justification in an effort to stop it. The court stated the following:

Id. at 649, 40 S.W.2d at 262.

In Washington v. State, 60 Ala. 10, 15, 31 Am.Rep. 28 (1877) (quoting Code of 1876, § 4295), in affirming a murder conviction where the defendant had fired a pistol into a room occupied by several people, the Alabama Supreme Court stated:

See also Gothard v. State,452 So.2d 889 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. stricken, 450 So.2d 479 (1984), and Smith v. State,460 So.2d 343 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), for cases involving drunk driving situations where convictions were had under § 13A-6-2(a)(2).

In the instant case, appellant questions the sufficiency of the State's evidence that he manifested extreme indifference to human life in general, an element of the offense charged which must be found to exist in order to sustain a conviction for reckless murder under § 13A-6-2(a)(2).

In deciding whether or not there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the trial court, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Cumbo v. State,368 So.2d 871 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978), cert. denied, 368 So.2d 877 (Ala. 1979); Bass v. State, 55 Ala.App. 88, 313 So.2d 208 (1975). The action of the trial court in denying a motion for judgment of acquittal and in denying a motion for a new trial must be reviewed by determining whether or not there existed legal evidence before the jury, at the time the motions were made, from which the jury by fair inference could find the defendant guilty. Thomas v. State,363 So.2d 1020 (Ala.Cr. App.1978). In applying this standard, the appellate court will only determine if legal evidence was presented from which the jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Willis v. State,447 So.2d 199 (Ala.Cr.App.1983); Thomas v. State, supra.

Section 13A-6-2(a)(2) requires the prosecution to prove conduct which manifests an extreme indifference to human life, and not to a particular person only. Its gravamen is the act of reckless by engaging in conduct which creates a grave or very great risk of death under circumstances "manifesting extreme indifference to human life." What amounts to "extreme indifference" depends on the circumstances of each case, but some shocking, outrageous, or special heinousness must be shown. Commentary to § 13A-6-2(a)(2); Northington, supra. A person acts recklessly when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk. § 13A-2-2(3). "The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation." Id. To bring appellant's conduct within the murder statute, the State is required to establish that his act was imminently dangerous and presented a very high or grave risk of death to others and that it was committed under circumstances which evidenced or manifested extreme indifference to human life. The conduct must manifest extreme indifference to human life generally. Ex parte McCormack, supra; Northington, supra. The crime charged here differs from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death of any particular person, but from an indifference to or disregard of the risks attending appellant's conduct.

The State's evidence of appellant's conduct in firing his pistol at the Dunnaway vehicle on the interstate highway without excuse or provocation, under the circumstances enumerated above, was sufficient for the jury to conclude that appellant was aware of a very great risk of death to others and consciously disregarded it. The evidence without question justifies a finding that appellant's conduct was unjustifiable and, because of the very great risk involved, that his conduct constituted a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe. There was sufficient evidence presented for the jury to conclude that appellant's conduct manifested an extreme indifference to human life generally. The firing at the vehicle under the circumstances created a very great risk of death to Dunnaway, the driver, as well as his passenger, Reeves, and to anyone else who might have been using that portion of the interstate highway on that occasion.

The evidence strongly supports the conclusion that appellant was bent on mischief and acted with a "don't give a damn attitude," in total disregard of the public safety. Napier v. State,357 So.2d 1001 (Ala. Cr.App.1977), rev'd on other grounds, 357 So.2d 1011 (Ala.1978).

To summarize, the State presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that appellant recklessly and unjustifiably engaged in conduct which manifested extreme indifference to human life, created a grave or very high risk of death to others, and caused a death. After examining the evidence and applying the proper standards of review, we find that there was sufficient evidence presented by the State to submit the case to the jury and for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant's conduct was well within that defined and proscribed by § 13A-6-2(a)(2).

Accordingly, appellant's motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial based on the assertion of insufficient evidence were properly denied. The judgment in this case is due to be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.