PATTERSON, Judge.
Appellant, Christopher Doyle King, was indicted by a two-count indictment for murder in violation of § 13A-6-2, Code of Alabama 1975. Count one charged that appellant
Count two charged that appellant
The case was tried to a jury, and on October 3, 1985, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder, as charged in count one. The trial court sentenced appellant to twenty years in the penitentiary and fined him $1,000, payable to the Alabama Crime Victims Compensation Fund.
King appeals, raising one issue: "Whether or not the State of Alabama failed to prove that the appellant manifested extreme indifference to human life in general as required by Section 13A-6-2(a)(2) of the Alabama Code so as to support a conviction for reckless murder." This issue was properly preserved for our review by a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief and by motion for new trial, both of which were overruled.
The evidence presented by the State disclosed that on the evening of November 22, 1984, Dwight Lee Reeves and his cousin, Rodney Dunnaway, traveled from Fultondale to Birmingham to visit Trader Johns, a nightclub in east Birmingham. They traveled in Dunnaway's automobile. That same evening, appellant and a friend, Bobby Knight, visited the same club. They traveled in appellant's blue pickup truck. While at the club, appellant and Reeves apparently "bumped" into each other and exchanged words. Both were apparently upset by the encounter. Dunnaway and Reeves left the club around 1:30 a.m. to go home. Appellant and Knight left shortly before Dunnaway and Reeves. As Dunnaway and Reeves were pulling out of the parking lot of the club, a blue pickup truck pulled up closely behind Dunnaway's automobile and stopped for a short period. Dunnaway was driving, and Reeves was sitting on the passenger's side in the front seat of the automobile. Dunnaway drove away from the club, entered the interstate highway, and proceeded westward toward downtown Birmingham and Fultondale at a speed of approximately fifty-five miles per hour. Appellant and Knight left the parking lot of the club in the pickup truck, which appellant was driving, and after entering the interstate highway, proceeded westward in the same direction as Dunnaway was proceeding, and in the opposite direction from appellant's home. Appellant observed Dunnaway's automobile and recognized the passenger, Reeves, as the person with whom he had had the altercation at the club. Appellant drove his truck closely behind Dunnaway's automobile and, while blinking his truck's lights, "tailgated" it for several miles. Dunnaway reduced his speed several times to let the truck pass, but it continued closely behind him. As the vehicles approached the 31st Street exit, appellant pulled a .38-caliber pistol from under the seat of his truck, pulled up beside Dunnaway's automobile on the right side, fired two or three shots at the vehicle, and turned right on the off-ramp, leaving the interstate highway. Bullets struck the rear tires of Dunnaway's vehicle, causing them to immediately go flat, and the vehicle came to a halt some distance beyond the 31st Street exit. One bullet pierced the window on the passenger's side and struck Reeves in the head. He fell over into Dunnaway's lap. Reeves died from the head wound several hours later. Reeves and Dunnaway were unarmed and did nothing to provoke the shooting. Appellant went home immediately after the incident and did not report it. The police investigation ultimately led to his arrest some two months later. Appellant gave conflicting stories to several persons about the incident, and when arrested, falsely stated that he had no knowledge of the incident. He disposed of the pistol in a "dumpster," and it was never recovered. The State's case was primarily based upon the testimony of Dunnaway and Knight, and the testimony of each was essentially consistent with the other's.
Knight, testifying for the State, stated that, just before the incident, appellant stated that he was going to "mess with them and shoot the tires out." He further testified that, just after the shooting, appellant stated that he "might have messed up or he shot the window out." In substance, Knight testified that there was no provocation or excuse for appellant's actions.
This court interpreted the meaning of reckless homicide proscribed by § 13A-6-2(a)(2), in Northington v. State,413 So.2d 1169 (Ala.Cr.App.1981), cert. quashed, 413 So.2d 1172 (Ala.1982). Therein, we stated the following:
Id. at 1170-71. We also stated,
Id. at 1172. The Supreme Court of Alabama subsequently adopted this interpretation. Ex parte Washington,448 So.2d 404, 408 (Ala.1984); Ex parte McCormack,431 So.2d 1340 (Ala.1983).
In Ex parte Weems,463 So.2d 170, 172 (Ala.1984), the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Faulkner, stated the following:
We find in a discussion of "depraved heart murder" in LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, § 70 (1972), the following:
In Hill v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 646, 40 S.W.2d 261 (1931), the court held that one who intentionally fires into an automobile which he knows is occupied and who kills someone therein is guilty of murder. Hill involved a traffic policeman firing at the tires of an occupied automobile without justification in an effort to stop it. The court stated the following:
Id. at 649, 40 S.W.2d at 262.
In Washington v. State, 60 Ala. 10, 15, 31 Am.Rep. 28 (1877) (quoting Code of 1876, § 4295), in affirming a murder conviction where the defendant had fired a pistol into a room occupied by several people, the Alabama Supreme Court stated:
See also Gothard v. State,452 So.2d 889 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. stricken, 450 So.2d 479 (1984), and Smith v. State,460 So.2d 343 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), for cases involving drunk driving situations where convictions were had under § 13A-6-2(a)(2).
In the instant case, appellant questions the sufficiency of the State's evidence that he manifested extreme indifference to human life in general, an element of the offense charged which must be found to exist in order to sustain a conviction for reckless murder under § 13A-6-2(a)(2).
In deciding whether or not there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the trial court, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Cumbo v. State,368 So.2d 871 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978), cert. denied, 368 So.2d 877 (Ala. 1979); Bass v. State, 55 Ala.App. 88, 313 So.2d 208 (1975). The action of the trial court in denying a motion for judgment of acquittal and in denying a motion for a new trial must be reviewed by determining whether or not there existed legal evidence before the jury, at the time the motions were made, from which the jury by fair inference could find the defendant guilty. Thomas v. State,363 So.2d 1020 (Ala.Cr. App.1978). In applying this standard, the appellate court will only determine if legal evidence was presented from which the jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Willis v. State,447 So.2d 199 (Ala.Cr.App.1983); Thomas v. State, supra.
Section 13A-6-2(a)(2) requires the prosecution to prove conduct which manifests an extreme indifference to human life, and not to a particular person only. Its gravamen is the act of reckless by engaging in conduct which creates a grave or very great risk of death under circumstances "manifesting extreme indifference to human life." What amounts to "extreme indifference" depends on the circumstances of each case, but some shocking, outrageous, or special heinousness must be shown. Commentary to § 13A-6-2(a)(2); Northington, supra. A person acts recklessly when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk. § 13A-2-2(3). "The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation." Id. To bring appellant's conduct within the murder statute, the State is required to establish that his act was imminently dangerous and presented a very high or grave risk of death to others and that it was committed under circumstances which evidenced or manifested extreme indifference to human life. The conduct must manifest extreme indifference to human life generally. Ex parte McCormack, supra; Northington, supra. The crime charged here differs from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death of any particular person, but from an indifference to or disregard of the risks attending appellant's conduct.
The State's evidence of appellant's conduct in firing his pistol at the Dunnaway vehicle on the interstate highway without excuse or provocation, under the circumstances enumerated above, was sufficient for the jury to conclude that appellant was aware of a very great risk of death to others and consciously disregarded it. The evidence without question justifies a finding that appellant's conduct was unjustifiable and, because of the very great risk involved, that his conduct constituted a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe. There was sufficient evidence presented for the jury to conclude that appellant's conduct manifested an extreme indifference to human life generally. The firing at the vehicle under the circumstances created a very great risk of death to Dunnaway, the driver, as well as his passenger, Reeves, and to anyone else who might have been using that portion of the interstate highway on that occasion.
The evidence strongly supports the conclusion that appellant was bent on mischief and acted with a "don't give a damn attitude," in total disregard of the public safety. Napier v. State,357 So.2d 1001 (Ala. Cr.App.1977), rev'd on other grounds, 357 So.2d 1011 (Ala.1978).
To summarize, the State presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that appellant recklessly and unjustifiably engaged in conduct which manifested extreme indifference to human life, created a grave or very high risk of death to others, and caused a death. After examining the evidence and applying the proper standards of review, we find that there was sufficient evidence presented by the State to submit the case to the jury and for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant's conduct was well within that defined and proscribed by § 13A-6-2(a)(2).
Accordingly, appellant's motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial based on the assertion of insufficient evidence were properly denied. The judgment in this case is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.