Case brief · Evidence

IN RE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS, G.S. and F.S. Case Brief

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit • 2010
Holding checked against the opinion
609 F.3d 909 Evidence Professional Responsibility Bankruptcy Law Criminal Procedure
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Case Brief Summary & Legal Analysis

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tl;dr: An attorney and his clients challenged an order compelling evidence in a bankruptcy-fraud investigation. The court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion in probable-cause determinations supporting the crime-fraud exception, including probable cause that the attorney was complicit, and finding sufficient grounds to compel non-opinion work product.

Legal Significance: The decision applies the crime-fraud exception to bankruptcy exemption planning supported by circumstantial evidence of fraudulent intent. It distinguishes clients’ privilege claims from an attorney’s independent work-product protection, requiring substantial need for non-opinion materials and sustaining disclosure of opinion materials based on probable cause of attorney complicity.

Case Facts & Court Holding

Key Facts & Case Background

G.S. and F.S. owned businesses experiencing financial difficulty and consulted bankruptcy attorney J.P. in late 2001. They moved from Iowa to Florida, which allowed greater bankruptcy exemptions, and sought advice about converting non-exempt assets into exempt property. J.P. warned against insider transactions and arrangements permitting recovery of assets after bankruptcy.

Nevertheless, the clients transferred nearly all their non-exempt assets to relatives. Their furniture, jewelry, business contract, and some stock went to G.S.’s parents. Other stock secured a $52,000 loan from H.B., funded by G.S.’s father. J.P. assisted with that transaction despite previously warning against the father’s involvement. The clients deposited transaction proceeds into exempt life insurance policies.

They commenced bankruptcy proceedings in Florida in March 2003. After bankruptcy, they returned to Iowa and repurchased their original assets from relatives at the original sale prices.

During a subsequent bankruptcy-fraud investigation, the government sought documents and testimony concerning J.P.’s representation. J.P. asserted attorney-client and work-product privileges, and the clients moved to intervene. After reviewing evidence in camera, the district court applied the crime-fraud exception and compelled production and testimony. J.P. and the clients appealed.

Court Holding & Legal Precedent

Issue: Did the district court abuse its discretion by compelling J.P.’s testimony and documents under the crime-fraud exception, including his opinion work product based on probable cause of his complicity?

The court affirmed the order compelling testimony and documents. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding probable cause that the clients used J.P.’s advice to further crime or fraud or that J.P. was complicit. The government also established substantial need for non-opinion work product, and the appellants did not contend that alternative means could supply the materials.

IRAC Legal Analysis

Legal Issue

Did the district court abuse its discretion by compelling J.P.’s testimony and documents under the crime-fraud exception, including his opinion work product based on probable cause of his complicity?

Conclusion

The decision illustrates how circumstantial evidence of coordinated asset transfers and post-bankruptcy recovery can support the crime-fraud exception. It preserves distinct requirements for obtaining an attorney’s non-opinion and opinion work product while sustaining disclosure on the record presented.

Legal Rule

Attorney-client privilege does not protect communications seeking advice to commit a crime or fraud, and clients cannot invoke work-product protection for documents generated in furtherance of their misconduct. In re Green Grand Jury Proceedings, 492 F.3d 976, 979–80 (8th Cir. 2007), quoting United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989). An attorney’s non-opinion work product generally requires substantial need and inability to obtain its substantial equivalent without undue hardship; an attorney unaware of the client’s wrongdoing retains protection for opinion work product. Green, 492 F.3d at 980–81, quoting In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977). Probable cause satisfies the evidentiary showing for the crime-fraud exception, and a district court’s determination receives deferential abuse-of-discretion review. Green, 492 F.3d at 983, 985.

Legal Analysis

The court distinguished permissible exemption planning from transactions undertaken with fraudulent intent. In re Addison, 540 F.3d 805, 813–17 (8th Cir. 2008), established that conversion alone is not fraudulent but identified relevant circumstantial indicators, including insider dealings, concealment, the amount converted, and the debtor’s overall conduct. In re Sholdan, 217 F.3d 1006, 1009–10 (8th Cir. 2000), likewise permitted fraudulent intent to be inferred from circumstances.

The clients transferred virtually all their non-exempt property to relatives, used an indirectly funded family loan, temporarily relocated to Florida, and recovered their assets after bankruptcy at their original prices. Together, these circumstances supported probable cause of a planned scheme involving sham transactions. The court treated a secret agreement to recover property as suggested by the evidence, not established, and described illegal concealment as arguable. It found a reasonable likelihood of crime or fraud sufficient to defeat the clients’ privilege claims.

Applying Green, the court separately assessed J.P.’s protections. Non-opinion materials could be critical to proving the transactions and the clients’ intent, establishing substantial need; appellants identified no alternative means of obtaining them.

For opinion work product, J.P.’s bankruptcy experience, warnings about insider transactions and later recovery, subsequent assistance with the questionable loan, and apparent awareness of contemplated reacquisition supported probable cause of complicity. The court found a reasonable likelihood that he knew or was willfully blind to sham transactions. Its deferential ruling sustained disclosure without adjudicating criminal guilt.

Separate opinions

Bye, concurring in part and dissenting in part: Bye agreed that the crime-fraud exception defeated attorney-client privilege but opposed compelling J.P.’s work product. Emphasizing opinion work product’s nearly absolute immunity, he found no compelling showing of knowing participation. He viewed the stock transaction as a disclosed secured loan and considered the evidence insufficient to show that J.P. assisted wrongful reacquisition after bankruptcy. He would have held that applying the exception to J.P.’s work-product claim was error.

The Opinions

Summary

  • The crime-fraud exception applies when there is probable cause that clients used legal advice to further bankruptcy fraud.
  • A pattern of conduct, including insider transactions and post-bankruptcy repurchase of assets, can serve as “badges of fraud” that distinguish a fraudulent scheme from legitimate exemption planning.
  • An attorney’s opinion work product is not protected if there is probable cause that the attorney was complicit or willfully blind to the client’s fraud.

Full text

Complete unedited opinion text as published by the court

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Attorney J.P. and his clients, intervenors G.S. and F. S., appeal from the district court's1 order compelling J.P. to testify and produce documents for the purpose of grand jury proceedings. The appellants argue that the testimony and documents are not discoverable because they are covered by the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product privilege. Because we conclude that the crime-fraud exception applies to the testimony and documents at issue, we affirm.

This case involves a grand jury investigation for bankruptcy fraud. In order to observe the requirements of grand jury secrecy, we provide only a limited recitation of the facts. Clients G.S. and F.S. are Iowa residents who owned several businesses that started experiencing financial difficulty around 2001. Recognizing that they would likely be unable to meet all of their financial obligations, G.S. and F.S. began planning to file for bankruptcy protection. In late 2001 they sought legal advice from attorney J.P., who had substantial experience in the area of bankruptcy law. G.S. and F.S. subsequently changed their residence from Iowa to Florida, a state which allows debtors to exempt more of their assets from the bankruptcy estate.

When G.S. and F.S. first met with J.P., they had a number of non-exempt assets that would have potentially been subject to liquidation by the bankruptcy trustee to pay their creditors, including thousands of dollars worth of household furniture, jewelry, various stock holdings, and a contract from the sale of a business that entitled them to payments of approximately $300,000 over seven years. G.S. and F.S. sought J.P.'s advice in divesting themselves of these assets and converting the proceeds into assets that would be exempt from the bankruptcy estate. In documents that we have reviewed in camera, J.P. warned his clients about avoiding bankruptcy fraud, counseling them concerning the dangers of engaging in insider transactions with close relatives and recovering assets post-bankruptcy. J.P. advised G.S. and F.S., for example, that they should not sell their furniture to G.S.'s father and keep it in their home, as the circumstances would suggest a sham transaction that bore badges of fraud. J.P. also cautioned against involving G.S.'s father in a transaction in which non-exempt stock would be pledged as collateral for a loan, telling G.S. that "I strongly advised your father to have nothing to do with this transaction."

Notwithstanding this advice, G.S. and F.S. divested themselves of nearly all of their non-exempt assets by selling or loaning them to close family members. The furniture, jewelry, business contract, and some of the stock holdings were sold to G.S.'s parents. The remaining stock was pledged to another relative, H.B., in exchange for a $52,000 loan. Because H.B. did not have money to make the loan, however, G.S.'s father gave her $52,000 to give to G.S., and attorney J.P. assisted with the transaction. G.S. and F.S. deposited the proceeds from these various transactions into life insurance policies that were exempt from the bankruptcy estate. In March 2003, a little over a year after the transactions had been completed, G.S. and F.S. began bankruptcy proceedings in Florida.

After the bankruptcy was complete, G.S. and F.S. returned to Iowa and recovered their original assets, repurchasing them from their relatives for the prices at which the assets had been sold. The Federal Bureau of Investigation subsequently began investigating G.S. and F.S. for bankruptcy fraud. In connection with the investigation, the government sought to compel the production of documents and testimony relating to J.P.'s representation of G.S. and F.S. prior to their bankruptcy proceedings. Attorney J.P. invoked the attorney-client and work product privileges and refused to testify or surrender documents to the government. G.S. and F.S. moved to intervene. After an in camera review of the relevant testimony and documents, the district court concluded that the subpoenaed evidence fell within the crime-fraud exception to the asserted privileges and ordered J.P. to appear before the grand jury.

Ordinarily, attorney-client communications and attorney work product are not discoverable, even in a grand jury investigation. In re Green Grand Jury Proceedings,492 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2007). The privileged nature of this evidence, however, is not absolute, for "[u]nder the crime-fraud exception, attorney-client privilege `does not extend to communications made for the purpose of getting advice for the commission of a fraud or a crime.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Zolin,491 U.S. 554, 563, 109 S.Ct. 2619, 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989)). Similarly, "a client who has used his attorney's assistance to perpetrate a crime or fraud cannot assert the work product privilege as to any documents generated in furtherance of his misconduct." Id. at 980.

The ability of an attorney to resist discovery of his or her own work product involves a somewhat different analysis, because it is "based on the attorney's interest in protecting his opinions and thought processes from disclosure." Id. In analyzing the extent of an attorney's own work product privilege, we distinguish between two types of work product. Non-opinion work product is "generally discoverable `upon a showing of substantial need and an inability to secure the substantial equivalent of the materials by alternate means without undue hardship.'" Id. (quoting In re Murphy,560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir.1977)). Opinion work product— which encompasses a lawyer's opinions, conclusions, mental impressions, and legal theories—is afforded substantially more protection. "[A]n attorney who is not complicit in his client's wrongdoing may assert the work product privilege with respect to his opinion work product." Id. at 981. Thus, even when an attorney's clients have used the attorney's services to commit a crime or fraud, the government cannot compel production of an attorney's opinion work product if the attorney was unaware of his client's wrongful activities. Id.

With respect to the standard of proof required to establish a crime or fraud, we have held that the district court's finding of probable cause satisfies the evidentiary showing necessary to compel production of privileged documents and testimony.2See id. at 983. When, as here, the district court has found probable cause for the application of the crime-fraud exception, we review its decision for abuse of discretion, according its determination considerable deference. Id. at 985.

The appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion in finding that there was probable cause to show that G.S. and F.S. sought their attorney's legal advice in furtherance of a crime or fraud. The government responds that there is ample evidence that the clients' pre-bankruptcy transactions, accomplished with their attorney's assistance, violated federal statutes prohibiting bankruptcy fraud.3

The appellants' main contention is that they engaged in legitimate pre-bankruptcy exemption planning and did not violate any laws when they transferred their non-exempt assets to close relatives before filing their bankruptcy papers. In support of this argument, they cite In re Addison,540 F.3d 805, 813 (8th Cir.2008), in which we reiterated the well-settled proposition that the mere conversion of nonexempt assets into exempt assets pre-bankruptcy is not in itself fraudulent. The touchstone for bankruptcy fraud is not the conversion of an asset from one form to another, which in many cases may simply allow a debtor to take advantage of legislatively sanctioned exemption provisions. Rather, the critical issue is whether the debtor had fraudulent intent. See In re Sholdan,217 F.3d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 2000). From this principle G.S. and F.S. extrapolate that the district court could not conclude that their actions were fraudulent unless it relied upon an unwarranted assumption about their purposes when they transferred their assets. As we explained in Addison, however, there are a variety of factors that courts look at in determining whether a debtor's actions crossed the line from legitimate bankruptcy planning to fraud—including whether there was any conduct designed to mislead, whether the debtor made an effort to conceal the pre-bankruptcy transfers, whether the transaction involved an insider, and the amount of property converted from non-exempt to exempt. 540 F.3d at 814, 816; see also Sholdan, 217 F.3d at 1009 ("Given the fact that direct evidence of fraud is rare, a court in most instances can only infer fraud by considering circumstantial evidence."). In certain cases a debtor's entire pattern of conduct may also suggest fraudulent intent, as when a debtor attempts to exempt virtually all of his assets from creditors while seeking the aid of the bankruptcy court in discharging a large amount of debt. Addison, 540 F.3d at 817 (discussing Norwest Bank Neb., N.A. v. Tveten,848 F.2d 871, 876 (8th Cir.1988)).

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in making its probable cause determination. The facts indicative of fraudulent intent in this case include the debtors' transfer of virtually all of their non-exempt property—which consisted of a variety of different assets worth hundreds of thousands of dollars—to close relatives. Even if certain individual transactions might have been permissible standing alone, as the appellants argue, when taken together these activities evince a pattern of conduct that may have gone beyond legitimate pre-bankruptcy exemption planning. Further, some of the transfers appeared to be specifically designed to conceal the true nature of the underlying transactions, as when G.S.'s father gave another relative, H.B., $52,000 so that she could loan the money to G.S., with his nonexempt stock holdings serving as collateral. The circumstances suggest that G.S. and F.S. may have avoided a more direct transaction with G.S.'s father because they feared that an intra-familial loan would arouse the suspicion of the bankruptcy trustee.

Moreover, the evidence indicates that once the bankruptcy was complete, G.S. and F.S. recovered their original assets from their family members for the same prices at which the assets had initially been sold. G.S. and F.S. also temporarily relocated to Florida to file their bankruptcy papers and returned to Iowa after the proceedings were final. Taken together, these facts give rise to the inference that G.S. and F.S. carried out a carefully planned scheme to divest themselves of all of their property through sham transactions, discharge their debts in bankruptcy, and immediately reacquire their original assets. If G.S. and F.S. had a secret agreement with their relatives to retrieve their property post-bankruptcy, as the circumstances tend to suggest, it is also arguable that their conduct involved illegal concealment of assets. See United States v. Turner,725 F.2d 1154, 1157 (8th Cir.1984) (explaining that the definition of concealment under 18 U.S.C. § 152 is broad and may include withholding knowledge or preventing disclosure or recognition); see also United States v. West,22 F.3d 586, 589-90 (5th Cir.1994) (holding that violations of 18 U.S.C. § 152 are not limited to fraudulent transfers within one year of filing bankruptcy, as appellant had argued). In short, there is a reasonable likelihood that the activity at issue here crossed the line from legitimate pre-bankruptcy exemption planning to a crime or fraud, with G.S. and F.S. using their attorney's advice to structure and carry out their transactions. Accordingly, the district court properly found that G.S. and F.S. could not assert the attorney-client privilege or the work product privilege with regard to J.P.'s representation of them in matters related to their bankruptcy.

Attorney J.P. separately resists the government's discovery of his work product related to representation of G.S. and F.S. In light of our holding regarding the possible misconduct of J.P.'s clients in close connection with J.P.'s legal advice, we conclude that the government has shown a substantial need for J.P.'s non-opinion work product. That evidence may contain information critical to the government's case should this matter proceed to a criminal trial, for the government would likely need to prove both the exact nature of the transactions and the clients' intent at the time that they were undertaken. Because the appellants do not contend that the government can obtain the materials through any other means, we also conclude that the district court did not err in compelling production of non-opinion work product. See Green Grand Jury Proceedings, 492 F.3d at 980 (explaining the standard for obtaining non-opinion work product).

The district court determined that J.P.'s opinion work product was discoverable because there was probable cause to believe J.P. was complicit in his clients' unlawful activity. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in making this finding. J.P.'s prior experience in the area of bankruptcy law should have made obvious to him the distinction between legitimate exemption planning and bankruptcy fraud. As noted previously, in documents that we have reviewed in camera, J.P. expressed concern to his clients about the legality of transferring assets to close relatives and retrieving the transferred assets post-bankruptcy.4 Although J.P. warned his clients that G.S.'s father should not be involved in the stock transfer in which some of G.S.'s non-exempt stock was pledged as collateral for a loan, J.P. later apparently ignored his own advice and helped facilitate the questionable transaction.

There is also a reasonable likelihood that J.P. either knew or was willfully blind to the fact that his clients were entering sham transactions with relatives so that they could later retrieve their original assets after discharging their debts. The appellants contend that J.P. had no knowledge of his clients' plans once the bankruptcy proceedings were complete. The documents that we have reviewed, however, suggest that J.P. was aware that G.S. and F.S. were contemplating strategies for reacquiring at least some of their assets at a later time. In spite of his apparent knowledge that this scheme could be illegal, J.P. continued to assist G.S. and F.S. in parking their assets with close family. Giving the district court's determination the deference to which it is entitled, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there was probable cause to believe that J.P. was complicit in his clients' crime or fraud. Accordingly, the district court properly held that J.P. could not assert the work product privilege with regard to his representation of G.S. and F.S. in matters related to their bankruptcy.

The judgment is affirmed. Mandate to issue forthwith.