Grams v. Milk Products, Inc. Case Brief

¶ 1. Petitioners Gerald and Joliene Grams (the Grams) seek review of an unpublished court of appeals decision1 affirming a grant of summary judgment to Milk Products, Inc. (Milk Products) by the circuit court for Rock County, John W Roethe, Judge. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit \*516court's determination that the economic loss doctrine barred the Grams' tort claims against Milk Products and Cargill, Inc. (Cargill).

¶ 2. The economic loss doctrine is a judicial doctrine intended to preserve the fundamental distinction between contract and tort. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec., Inc., 2004 WI 139, ¶ 15, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 688 N.W.2d 462. It works to prevent a party to a contract from employing tort remedies to compensate the party for purely economic losses arising from the contract. There are exceptions. For instance, we noted several years ago that "The economic loss doctrine does not preclude a product purchaser's claims of personal injury or damage to property other than the product itself." Wausau Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 247, 593 N.W.2d 445 (1999) (emphasis added). Over time, however, the parameters of this "other property" exception have proved elusive. In this case, we must decide whether the Grams' claimed damages fall within the scope of the "other property" exception.

¶ 3. We hold that if claimed damages are the result of disappointed expectations of a bargained-for product's performance, the economic loss doctrine applies to bar the plaintiffs tort claims and the plaintiff must rely upon contractual remedies alone. In this case, the Grams allege in tort that the object of the contract, a "milk replacer" intended for livestock nourishment, did not adequately nourish their calves and that some died. Because we find that this tort claim is, at bottom, based on disappointed performance expectations, we hold that it does not fit within the "other property" exception and is therefore barred by the economic loss doctrine. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

\*517I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

¶ 4. Because this case is before us on the defendants' motion for summary judgment, we take the Grams' version of the facts as true.

¶ 5. Gerald and Joliene Grams have specialized in raising calves since 1992. The Grams acquire the calves when they are between three and five days old and raise them until they are approximately four months old, at which time they resell them. At the time of this dispute, the Grams were raising approximately 6000 calves each year.

¶ 6. For the first few weeks of their lives, the calves are fed a milk substitute which, in farming parlance, is called a "milk replacer." The Grams used a Cargill milk replacer known as "Half-Time." This product included medications designed to keep the calves healthy during the first few weeks of their lives, a critical time in which the calves' immune systems are developing. The "Half-Time" milk replacer was manufactured for Cargill by Milk Products, Inc.

¶ 7. In November 2000, the Grams asked a Cargill representative about obtaining a less expensive milk replacer. The representative told the Grams that they could purchase "Half-Time" milk replacer without medication at a lower price than the medicated version. The Grams began using this non-medicated version in January 2001. As with the medicated "Half-Time," the non-medicated version was sold by Cargill and manufactured by Milk Products.

¶ 8. Soon after they began using the non-medicated "Half-Time," the Grams noticed certain problems developing in their calves. Specifically, the calves were not gaining weight properly and appeared gaunt and hungry. In addition, the mortality rate of the calves \*518tripled, from an average of 9 percent before the new replacer was used to a high of 34 percent after the new replacer was introduced. By June 2001, after making severed attempts to remedy these problems with Cargill and later with Milk Products, the Grams discontinued using the non-medicated "Half-Time." The Grams believed that poor nutritional content in the non-medicated replacer had damaged the calves' immune systems, which in turn caused the poor growth of the calves and their higher mortality rate.

¶ 9. The Grams filed suit against Cargill and Milk Products on October 22, 2001. They alleged five causes of action, one in contract and four in tort: (1) breach of implied warranty; (2) strict liability tort; (3) negligence; (4) intentional misrepresentation; and (5) strict responsibility misrepresentation. The Grams alleged all five causes of action "jointly and severally" against the two defendants.

¶ 10. The circuit court granted summary judgment to both Cargill and Milk Products on all four tort claims, finding that those claims were barred by the economic loss doctrine. The circuit court also granted summary judgment to Milk Products on the Grams' contract claim because there was no privity between the Grams and Milk Products, and it dismissed Milk Products from the case. This left only the Grams' contract claim against Cargill.

¶ 11. The Grams appealed, alleging that the circuit court erred in dismissing their contract claim against Milk Products as well as all their tort claims. The court of appeals affirmed on both issues. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., No. 2003AP801, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 17, 2004). We granted review to \*519determine whether the Grams' tort claims are barred by the economic loss doctrine.2

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 12. This court reviews motions for summary judgment de novo, using the same methodology as the circuit court. Town of Delafield v. Winkelman, 2004 WI 17, ¶ 15, 269 Wis. 2d 109, 675 N.W.2d 470. Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (2001-02).3 The interpretation of the economic loss doctrine is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 910, 915, 437 N.W.2d 213 (1989).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Economic Loss Doctrine

¶ 13. The economic loss doctrine is a judicially created doctrine intended to preserve the boundary between tort and contract. To illustrate, the commercial purchaser of a product may not recover from the manufacturer or seller, under negligence or strict liabil\*520ity theories, for solely economic losses arising from that product. This is especially true when a warranty given by the manufacturer specifically precludes the recovery of such damages. Van Lare v. Vogt, Inc., 2004 WI 110, ¶ 18, 274 Wis. 2d 631, 683 N.W.2d 46. In Wisconsin, the economic loss doctrine is based on three fundamental premises. It seeks "(1) to maintain the fundamental distinction between tort law and contract law; (2) to protect commercial parties' freedom to allocate economic risk by contract; and (3) to encourage the party best situated to assess the risk of economic loss, [that is,] the commercial purchaser, to assume, allocate, or insure against that risk." Id., ¶ 17 (quoting Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 403, 573 N.W.2d 842 (1998)).

¶ 14. Tort law generally offers a "broader array" of damages than contract.4 Cease Elec., 276 Wis. 2d. 361, ¶ 24. As a result, many products liability plaintiffs would prefer to sue in tort. It has been said that without a boundary maintaining the distinction between the two, "contract law would drown in a sea of tort." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Wis. 2d 305, 320, 592 N.W.2d 201 (1999) (quoting E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986)).

¶ 15. Wisconsin has recognized the superior ability of contract law, and in particular the Uniform \*521Commercial Code (UCC), to deal with certain kinds of disputes. Cease Elec., 276 Wis. 2d 361, ¶ 33. In Cease Electric, however, we declined to apply the economic loss doctrine to contracts for services. Id., ¶ 2. Central to our decision was the fact that no body of law similar to the UCC applies to contracts for services. We recognized that the UCC provides a "comprehensive system for compensating consumers for economic loss arising from the purchase of defective products." Id., ¶ 28 (citing State Farm, 225 Wis. 2d at 342.) When a product proves to be defective, the UCC allows the aggrieved buyer to sue for breach of warranty or (under certain circumstances) to return the goods and sue for breach of contract. Id., ¶ 29. See also Wis. Stat. §§ 402.313 (express warranties), 402.314, 402.315 (implied warranties), 402.602 (rejection), 402.608 (revoking acceptance).

¶ 16. Concern about duplicating or overriding UCC provisions was an important reason this court chose to adopt the economic loss doctrine in the first place. Sunnyslope, 148 Wis. 2d at 916. In that case, we refused to allow the plaintiff to circumvent a warranty through a tort claim, reasoning that the "protections granted by the [UCC] are not to be buttressed by tort principles and recovery." Id. (internal citations omitted).

¶ 17. In addition, contract law and tort law embody distinctly different approaches to risk sharing. The UCC provides a structure that encourages parties to a contract to allocate the economic risks of a given transaction between or among themselves. Daanen & Janssen, 216 Wis. 2d at 407. This is especially true when a manufacturer produces a part or component that can be used in a variety of ways. In that case, a \*522party down the supply chain — often the ultimate purchaser — may be best situated to assess the risk and guard against it by securing a warranty, buying insurance, or allocating risk in other ways. Id. at 411.

¶ 18. Tort law, unlike contract, does not permit risk sharing. It imposes obligations. Tort law is designed to "protect society against the unreasonable risk of harm from accidental and unexpected injury." Cease Elec., 276 Wis. 2d 361, ¶ 39. When a product poses these types of risks to society, "public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market." E. River, 476 U.S. at 866 (internal citations omitted). When a manufacturer designs or produces a product that poses such a risk, responsibility for the resulting injuries will redound to the manufacturer.

¶ 19. This tort rationale breaks down when a loss is purely economic. When parties of roughly equal bargaining power allocate risks of loss through negotiation, society has no special interest in overturning that allocation. Id. at 873. If buyers could recover purely economic losses through tort suits, manufacturers could never rely on the risk allocations they negotiated through contract. Instead, end users could circumvent unfavorable warranties simply by suing a manufacturer up the production chain, or negotiate for no warranty at all and rely on tort law as their insurer. Daanen & Janssen, 216 Wis. 2d at 408. This would be contrary to the public policy embodied in the UCC, which lays out a carefully constructed framework of warranties to allow manufacturers to negotiate limits on their risk. See id. at 407-408 (citing Wis. Stat. § 402.719(3) (seller can limit consequential damages as long as the limitation is \*523not unconscionable)). Tort recovery for purely economic losses would also be contrary to sound economic policy. If a manufacturer must always insure its products against economic loss, all manufacturers will be transformed "into insurers with seemingly unlimited tort liability." Id. at 412. With no ability to share their risk with commercial users of the product, manufacturers would understandably be reluctant to produce certain products. Id. at 408. They also would be prevented from providing lower cost products to parties willing to assume the risk of certain losses.

¶ 20. The economic loss doctrine, therefore, differentiates between economic losses, for which risk sharing is encouraged, and other losses, such as personal injury losses, where risk sharing is undesirable as a matter of public policy.

B. The "Other Property" Exception to the Economic Loss Doctrine

¶ 21. The economic loss doctrine has been traced to a landmark decision by the California Supreme Court, Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965), involving a defective truck. The court allowed recovery for breach of an express warranty but refused to allow recovery on the basis of strict product liability. The court said that a manufacturer can be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects "by requiring his goods to match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be held for the level of performance of his products in the consumer's business unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet the consumer's demands." Id. at 151.

\*524¶ 22. The law following Seely was summarized by Professor William K. Jones of Columbia University School of Law in 1990:

If a product fails to function properly, the buyer usually incurs expenses in repairing or replacing the product. In addition, the buyer's business may he disrupted, resulting in lost profits. Such "economic losses" generally cannot be recovered in tort actions alleging negligence or strict product liability. If, however, the defect in the product causes physical injury to property, tort remedies are available. The distinction is easy to apply in some cases, but it poses severe difficulties in others.

William K. Jones, Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy of Contract over Tort, 44 U. Miami L. Rev. 731, 747-48 (1990) (emphasis added).

¶ 23. In the East River case, the Supreme Court embraced the economic loss doctrine but expanded it, indicating that physical damage to the product itself was covered by the doctrine. The Court stated:

We realize that the damage [to the defective product] may be qualitative, occurring through gradual deterioration or internal breakage. Or it may be calamitous. But either way, since by definition no person or other property is damaged, the resulting loss is purely economic. Even when the harm to the product itself occurs through an abrupt, accident-like event, the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased value, and lost profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of its bargain — traditionally the core concern of contract law.

Id. at 870 (emphasis added).

¶ 24. This court has recognized the "other property" exception in Wisconsin. Daanen & Janssen, 216 Wis. 2d at 402 ("The economic loss doctrine . . . does not \*525bar a commercial purchaser's claims based on personal injury or damage to property other than the product, or economic loss claims that are alleged in combination with noneconomic losses.") (citing cases). It has also acknowledged, as Professor Jones did, that "distinguishing between economic loss and physical harm to property other than the product itself is often a difficult task . . .." Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 162 Wis. 2d 918, 932, 471 N.W.2d 179 (1991).

¶ 25. The economic loss doctrine has been approved in the majority of jurisdictions throughout the United States. Consequently, there is a substantial body of law showing how various states have defined and dealt with the "other property" exception. Minnesota presents an interesting case study. See Jacquelyn K. Brunmeier, Death by Footnote: The Life and Times of Minnesota's Economic Loss Doctrine, 19 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 871 (1993). Minnesota adopted the economic loss doctrine in 1981 in Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981). The court stated: "[W]e hold that economic losses that arise out of commercial transactions, except those involving personal injury or damage to other property, are not recoverable under the tort theories of negligence or strict products liability." Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 162 (emphasis added). Less than a decade later, however, the court overruled Superwood, concluding that the UCC exclusively controls claims alleging only property damage in a commercial transaction. Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990). The case, which involved diseased seed potatoes, effectively eliminated the "other property" exception in Minnesota.5

\*526¶ 26. Two years later, when Michigan adopted the economic loss doctrine in Neibarger v. Universal Coops, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. 1992), the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the approach this court took in Sunnyslope and instead embraced Minnesota's approach in Hapka. The Michigan court stated: "Where damage to other property was caused by the failure of a product purchased for commercial purposes to perform as expected, and this damage was within the contemplation of the parties to the agreement, the occurrence of such damage could have been the subject of negotiations between the parties." Neibarger, 486 N.W.2d at 620. See Christian W. Fabian, Case Note, 70 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 513 (1993) (discussing Neibarger).

¶ 27. In this state, the evolution of the economic loss doctrine has been slower than in Minnesota and Michigan; our appellate decisions have repeatedly used techniques to limit the scope of the "other property" exception without eliminating it. Like many other states, we have incorporated the concept of an "integrated system." If the "product" at issue is a defective \*527component in a larger "system," the other components are not regarded as "other property" in a legal sense, even if they are different property in a literal sense.

¶ 28. This principle was stated in Wausau Tile: "Damage by a defective component of an integrated system to either the system as a whole or other system components is not damage to 'other property' which precludes the application of the economic loss doctrine." Wausau Tile, 226 Wis. 2d at 249.6 Thus, a manufacturer of concrete pavers was not permitted to sue two of its suppliers in tort for supplying allegedly defective cement and aggregate. The cement and aggregate were deemed components of a more complete product, or "integrated system." The court explained that when harm results from a defective component of a product, the product itself is deemed to have caused the harm. Id. at 250 (citing Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 883 (1997)).7

¶ 29. The court of appeals applied the integrated system principle to building construction in Bay Breeze Condominium Ass'n v. Norco Windows, Inc., 2002 WI App 205, 257 Wis. 2d 511, 651 N.W.2d 738, a case involving windows that were installed in a condominium complex. The condominium association sued the window manufacturer claiming numerous problems \*528related to the windows including leakage into the units and walls around the windows and rotting and deterioration of wood window casements and frames. The circuit court dismissed the association's tort claims even though the association could prove damage to property other than the windows.

¶ 30. When the court of appeals affirmed, it acknowledged that the economic loss doctrine "does not apply... if the damage is to property other than the defective product itself." Id., ¶ 13. However, the court concluded that the economic loss doctrine applies to building construction defects when the defective product is a component part of an integrated structure or finished product. "The law of Casa Clara [Condominium Association v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993)] is consistent with Wisconsin precedent addressing component parts that cause damage to an integrated product, which results in only economic loss." Id., ¶ 26. "Because of the integral relationship between the windows, the casements and the surrounding walls, the windows are simply a part of a single system or structure, having no function apart from the buildings for which they were manufactured." Bay Breeze, 257 Wis. 2d 511, ¶ 27.

¶ 31. The "integrated system" concept does not translate well to all situations involving property damage to which the economic loss doctrine logically applies. To address situations in which a different explanation is needed for delimiting the other property exception, the court of appeals adopted the "disappointed expectations" concept which entails a different analysis. This concept governs situations in which a commercial product causes property damage but the damage was within the scope of bargaining, or as the Michigan Supreme Court reasoned, "the occurrence of \*529such damage could have been the subject of negotiations between the parties." Neibarger, 486 N.W.2d at 620.8

\*530¶ 32. The "disappointed expectations" concept is grounded in contract principles of bargaining and risk sharing, not on a redefinition of "other property." The determination of whether particular damage qualifies as damage to "other property" turns on the parties' expectations of the function of the bargained-for product. See Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 972 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (citing Dakota Gasification Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys., 91 F.3d 1094 (8th Cir. 1996)).

¶ 33. The "disappointed expectations" concept is illustrated in two cases from the court of appeals. In D'Huyvetter v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, 164 Wis. 2d 306, 317, 475 N.W.2d 587 (Ct. App. 1990), the plaintiff purchased a "Harvestore" grain silo system from the defendant. According to D'Huyvetter, the silo failed to operate properly because it did not protect the integrity of the stored feed. The compromised feed caused damage to D'Huyvetter's livestock including reduced milk production, loss of profits from sale of cattle, and the death and illness of some of the livestock. Id. at 326.

¶ 34. The court of appeals held that the damage to D'Huyvetter's livestock did not come within the "other property" exception to the economic loss doctrine. The court reasoned that "[t]he expected function of the Harvestore was to enrich the feed, providing enhanced nutrition for the cows. The damages stem from the failure of the Harvestore to perform 'as expected.'" Id. at 328.9

\*531¶ 35. The court of appeals applied a similar "disappointed expectations" test in Selzer v. Brunsell Brothers, Ltd., 2002 WI App 232, 257 Wis. 2d 809, 652 N.W.2d 806. In Selzer, the plaintiff bought windows that the defendant warranted to be "deep-treated to permanently protect against rot and decay." Id., ¶ 5. Seven years after the windows were installed, the plaintiff noticed that the windows were rotting, and that the rot had spread to the siding around the windows. Id., ¶ 6. Selzer argued that the rot in the siding was damage to "other property" and thus the economic loss doctrine would not bar his tort claim.

¶ 36. The court of appeals disagreed. It observed that this was a loss that "at bottom, [involved] disappointed performance expectations." Id., ¶ 36. Selzer bought the windows expecting that they would resist rot. They failed to do so. The court reasoned that the rot in the surrounding wood was a direct consequence of the rot in the windows themselves. Id., ¶ 37. The collateral rot was part of Selzer's disappointed expectations. The court said that because Selzer did not prove any harm beyond disappointed expectations, he was precluded from pursuing a recovery in tort. The court added: "Had the windows resisted rot but spontaneously shattered, spewing shards of glass into an adjacent Picasso, Selzer might well argue that the defective windows damaged his painting in an entirely unanticipated manner, going well beyond a failure to perform as expected and entitling him to pursue a tort remedy." Id.

\*532¶ 37. The court's picturesque hypothetical was designed to show the corollary of the disappointed expectations concept, namely, a situation in which the damage to "other property" and the risk of that damage was entirely unanticipated.

¶ 38. The 1989 case of Tony Spychalla Farms, Inc. v. Hopkins Agricultural Chemical Company, 151 Wis. 2d 431, 444 N.W.2d 743 (Ct. App. 1989), is often cited as the prime example of the corollary principle . . . the "flip side" of D'Huyvetter. See Rich Prods., 66 F. Supp. 2d at 975. In Spychalla, the plaintiff treated his potato seed with a chemical dust designed to prevent rot. The chemical correctly performed that function, but it also petrified Spychalla's seed, resulting in a significantly reduced crop. 151 Wis. 2d at 435. Spychalla filed suit against the manufacturer of the chemical dust under a theory of strict liability tort, alleging that the chemical was unreasonably dangerous to the seed. Id. The jury found for Spychalla on his tort claim and awarded him more than $225,000 in damages. Spychalla, 151 Wis. 2d at 434.

¶ 39. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the economic loss doctrine did not bar the plaintiffs tort claim. The court asserted that the chemical dust that Spychalla purchased was a dangerous product. Spychalla had expected the chemical to protect his crop by preventing rot, and it had done its work in that regard. Id. at 438. However, it inflicted damage in an unanticipated manner. This unanticipated damage to "other property," id. at 439, was deemed outside the economic loss doctrine.

¶ 40. Accepting the facts in Spychalla as reported, the court's decision is not wholly incompatible with the economic loss doctrine. Nonetheless, it must be remembered that the trial in that case occurred on June 15, \*5331987, almost two years before Wisconsin formally adopted the economic loss doctrine. There is a chance that a similar case would be decided differently today, realizing that a similar transaction would be subject to the UCC, and that it would not be unreasonable for the parties to anticipate a risk that the chemical dust could damage potato seed. In a new case, the result could turn on the purpose for purchasing the product, the reasonableness of anticipating a risk of the product's failed performance, the availability of warranties or risk sharing mechanisms, and the extremity of the facts.

¶ 41. In Seely, 40 years ago, the California court said that a defendant "cannot be held for the level of performance of his products in the consumer's business unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet the consumer's demands." Seely, 403 P.2d at 151. "Level of performance" should now be understood to include failed performance. Today in a commercial setting, a sophisticated buyer must anticipate the risk that a purchased product will disappoint in its performance or fail entirely, and protect himself accordingly against economic loss.

¶ 42. The test adopted in Selzer — whether at bottom, the claim involves disappointed performance expectations — is an appropriate analytic tool to determine whether the other property exception applies. Selzer, 257 Wis. 2d 809, ¶ 36. This test certainly includes consideration of the purpose or thrust of the bargain and the contractual expectations of the parties.

¶ 43. In exploring the parameters of the "other property" exception to the economic loss doctrine, we will incorporate this concept of "disappointed expectations" into our analysis, as well as the integrated system \*534concept. This does not mean that contract principles will envelop all damages foreseeable "in a remote or general sense." Rich Prods., 66 F. Supp. 2d at 975. Rather, the economic loss doctrine will apply when "prevention of the subject risk was one of the contractual expectations motivating the purchase of the defective product." Id.

¶ 44. The Grams urge this court to resolve the "other property" conundrum by adopting a new "bright line rule," that physical damage to anything other than the product itself would be considered damage to "other property" and therefore subject to suit in tort, and this argument attracts the dissent. See Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶¶ 74, 80. The Grams concede that this proposal would obliterate the distinction between literal "other property" and legal "other property" discussed in the case law. Suits in tort would be allowed whenever damage extends beyond the physical dimensions of the purchased product. If such a rule were applied to this case, the Grams' tort claims could proceed because the calves were property different from the replacer.

¶ 45. We decline to adopt such a rule. The proposed rule would reject inquiry into the scope of the bargain and replace it with an overly formalistic distinction based on the kind of property harmed. Such a distinction would inevitably cause the erosion of the UCC. The "fundamental distinction" between contract and tort espoused in our cases would be lost.10

\*535¶ 46. Under the UCC, product warranties are important and necessary vehicles for limiting a manufacturer's liability for risks associated with the possible uses of a product, not just diminution in value of the product itself. When a product is intended to be used as part of an integrated system, the integrated system rule allows the manufacturer to share the risk that its product will damage the rest of the system. See Wausau Tile, 226 Wis. 2d at 258-59. In adopting the integrated system concept, we recognized that "[s]ince all but the very simplest of machines have component parts, a holding that a component of a machine was 'other property' would require a finding of 'property damage' in virtually every case where a product damages itself. Such a holding would eliminate the distinction between warranty and strict products liability." Id. at 250 (quoting Saratoga Fishing Co., 520 U.S. at 883).

¶ 47. The same rationale applies here. If a product is expected and intended to interact with other products and property, it naturally follows that the product could adversely affect and even damage that property. A rule that allows tort recovery based on what is damaged, rather than whether the risk of that damage was within the scope of the bargain, would leave little room for contract.

¶ 48. Accordingly, we decline to adopt the Grams' proposed rule, and proceed to the facts of this case using the disappointed expectations test.

\*536IV APPLICATION

¶ 49. The Grams claim that the non-medicated milk replacer they bought from Cargill damaged their calves' immune systems, leading to poor growth and higher mortality. Consistent with the foregoing analysis, we ask whether, at bottom, this claim involves disappointment in the milk replacer's performance and failure of the product to fulfill the Grams' contractual expectations.

¶ 50. The first step in our inquiry is to determine what those expectations were. This necessitates an inquiry into the substance and the purpose of the transaction. The record shows that the expected function of the milk replacer was to provide sustenance for the Grams' calves. The Grams expected that the "HalfTime" non-medicated replacer would properly nourish the calves, much as the old replacer had, so that the calves would grow. This bargain was not about milk replacer per se; it was about a product that would foster the healthy development and growth of young calves.

¶ 51. The next step is to inquire whether the Grams' claim is about disappointment with those expectations. In this case, the milk replacer did not properly nourish the calves. Poor nourishment led to a number of consequences for the calves, including weakened immune systems and for some, even death. The re-placer did not do what the parties expected it to do, and this caused the exact result the Grams sought to avoid. It is difficult to think of a better example of disappointed expectations than a product that is expected to nourish animals but leaves them malnourished. The Grams' expectations were disappointed; the fact that they were severely disappointed does not change the analysis.

\*537¶ 52. The Grams argue that this case is like Spychalla; that the damage caused by the replacer was worse than failed expectations. The replacer not only stunted the calves' growth, it killed some of them. The Grams argue that when the replacer killed some of the calves, the result was entirely unanticipated, similar to the petrification of the seed in Spychalla.

¶ 53. This argument ignores the intertwined nature of calf health, nutrition, and mortality. The Grams bargained for a replacer that would nourish the calves and make them grow. Even with high quality medicated milk replacer, the mortality rate of the Grams' calves ran about 9 percent. A reasonable farmer would know that switching to an unmedicated milk replacer could cause some increase in calf mortality. The only question was how much. Obviously, the Grams expected a lower increase in calf mortality than actually occurred, but that does not change the fact that the calves' nutrition —or, unfortunately, malnutrition — was at the heart of the bargain the Grams made. We think this is consistent with the teaching of Spychalla.

¶ 54. We acknowledge that determining whether a case is one of disappointed performance expectations will not always be as simple as it is here. It will necessarily require interpretation of the purpose of a transaction and the expected uses of a product. While courts undertaking this inquiry should be mindful to prevent "contract from drowning in a sea of tort," they should also prevent tort from drowning in a sea of contract.11 See R. Thomas Cane & Sheila Sullivan, The future of the economic loss doctrine in Wisconsin, Wis\*538consin Lawyer, May 2005, at 14. We believe the disappointed expectations concept will prove useful in striking an appropriate balance.

V CONCLUSION

¶ 55. The Grams have a contractually rooted claim against Cargill for breach of implied warranty that remains to be resolved at the circuit court.12 Because their tort claims are, at bottom, based on their disappointment with the performance of the non-medicated milk replacer, their contract claim is the proper vehicle for resolving this dispute. We therefore affirm the court of appeals.

By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.

¶ 56.