Case Brief Summary & Legal Analysis

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tl;dr: Clark sought to hold Chatham’s employer liable for a collision while Chatham delivered a telephone-service check for her future employer. Because no evidence showed that the delivery furthered her current employer’s business, the court reversed the Court of Appeals and ordered summary judgment reinstated for Chorey Taylor.

Legal Significance: The decision confirms that respondeat superior requires evidence that an employee acted within the scope of employment and furthered the employer’s business. Benefits to fellow employees and a coworker’s characterization of a request as employment-related did not establish that connection.

Case Facts & Court Holding

Key Facts & Case Background

In April 1996, Dannice Clark was injured when her automobile was struck by a car driven by Wanda Chatham, an employee of Vincent, Chorey, Taylor & Feil, P.C. Chatham was driving her personal vehicle to deliver a telephone-service check for Vincent, Berg, Stalzer & Menendez, P.C., a new firm established by some attorneys from her current firm. The new firm had not opened, and Chatham had agreed to begin working there in May 1996. A fellow employee had asked Chatham to deliver the check, which was issued by an entity other than her employer. Chorey, Taylor & Feil, P.C. was the subsequent configuration of Chatham’s employer at the time of the collision.

Clark sued Chatham, Vincent Berg, and Chorey Taylor, asserting respondeat superior against the firms. The trial court granted both firms summary judgment. Clark appealed only the judgment for Chorey Taylor. A divided Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that a factfinder should decide whether Chatham acted within the scope of employment. The Supreme Court of Georgia granted Chorey Taylor’s petition for certiorari.

Court Holding & Legal Precedent

Issue: Was Chorey Taylor entitled to summary judgment on Clark’s respondeat superior claim when no evidence showed that Chatham’s delivery of a check for her future employer furthered her current employer’s business?

The court reversed the Court of Appeals and ordered reinstatement of summary judgment for Chorey Taylor. No evidence showed that Chatham’s attempted check delivery furthered her employer’s business. A possible benefit to fellow employees and the requesting coworker’s description of her own capacity did not establish that Chatham acted on her employer’s business.

IRAC Legal Analysis

Legal Issue

Was Chorey Taylor entitled to summary judgment on Clark’s respondeat superior claim when no evidence showed that Chatham’s delivery of a check for her future employer furthered her current employer’s business?

Conclusion

The decision establishes that a coworker’s request and potential benefits to fellow employees do not alone establish that an employee furthered the employer’s business. It supports summary judgment when the evidence and reasonable inferences fail to supply that essential connection.

Legal Rule

Under OCGA § 51-2-2, employer liability depends on whether the employee acted within the scope of employment and on the employer’s business when the injury occurred. Allen Kane’s Major Dodge v. Barnes, 243 Ga. 776, 777, 257 S.E.2d 186 (1979). An employer is not liable for torts arising from matters disconnected from employment. Frazier v. Southern R. Co., 200 Ga. 590(2), 37 S.E.2d 774 (1946). Although scope of employment generally presents a jury question, summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence and all reasonable inferences show that the employee pursued a private enterprise rather than furthering the employer’s business. Jones v. Reserve Ins. Co., 149 Ga.App. 176(3), 253 S.E.2d 849 (1979).

Legal Analysis

The court applied the requirement from Allen Kane’s Major Dodge v. Barnes that an employee act both within the scope of employment and on the employer’s business. Under Jones v. Reserve Ins. Co., the ordinarily factual scope-of-employment inquiry may be resolved by summary judgment when the evidence and reasonable inferences establish no furtherance of the employer’s business.

Chatham was delivering a check issued by another entity to initiate telephone service for another entity. Nothing showed that this task furthered her current employer’s business. Indeed, the court observed that the delivery appeared to help fellow employees establish a competing business. A benefit to those employees did not establish a benefit to the employer.

The coworker who requested the delivery later described herself as acting in her capacity as an employee. Without evidence that the employer’s business included helping establish new law firms, that characterization did not show that Chatham was conducting the employer’s business.

The Court of Appeals had inferred that refusing the delivery could adversely affect Chatham’s current or future employment. The majority nevertheless found no evidence connecting the delivery to her current employer’s business. Drawing on Allen Kane’s Major Dodge, it emphasized that circumstantial inferences can be legally insufficient to defeat summary judgment. The record therefore did not warrant submitting the claim against Chorey Taylor to a factfinder.

The Opinions

Summary

An employer is not vicariously liable for an employee’s tort unless the employee was acting within the scope of employment and on the employer’s business.
An employee’s act that benefits a separate, competing entity is not within the scope of employment, even if requested by a co-worker.
Summary judgment for the employer is proper when evidence shows the employee’s actions were disconnected from the employer’s business.

Full text

Complete unedited opinion text as published by the court

BENHAM, Chief Justice.

We granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in order to address that court's application of the doctrine of respondeat superior to the facts of this case in Clark v. Chorey, Taylor & Feil, P.C.,240 Ga.App. 232, 522 S.E.2d 472 (1999). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

In April 1996, appellee Dannice Clark was injured when her automobile was struck by a car driven by Wanda Chatham, an employee of a law firm named Vincent, Chorey, Taylor & Feil, P.C. ("Vincent Chorey"). The collision occurred while Ms. Chatham was on her way in her personal vehicle to deliver a check for telephone service for Vincent, Berg, Stalzer & Menendez, P.C. ("Vincent Berg"). Vincent Berg was a new law firm not yet open for business that had been established by some of the Vincent Chorey attorneys, and was the law firm for which Chatham had agreed to begin work in May 1996. Appellant Chorey, Taylor & Feil, P.C. ("Chorey Taylor") is the current configuration (following the departure of the Vincent Berg attorneys) of the law firm that employed Chatham at the time of the collision. Appellee Clark filed a personal injury action against Chatham and, citing the doctrine of respondeat superior, included as defendants Chatham's employer at the time of filing suit (Vincent Berg) and Chorey Taylor. The trial court awarded summary judgment to both Vincent Berg and Chorey Taylor, and Clark appealed the entry of judgment in favor of Chorey Taylor. A divided Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment to Chorey Taylor after concluding that a factfinder should determine whether Chatham was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the collision. The Court of Appeals opined that it could be inferred from the facts that Chatham's mission was not a purely personal pursuit entirely disconnected from her employment, and that it could be inferred that Chatham's attempt to deliver the check on behalf of Vincent Berg was not voluntary since her employment at Vincent Chorey and her future employment at Vincent Berg could have been adversely affected had she not delivered the check. Clark v. Chorey Taylor, supra. We granted Chorey Taylor's petition for a writ of certiorari.

"The clearest case of vicarious liability [that is, liability for the tort of another] is that of a master for harm caused by acts of his servant." Harper, James & Gray, The Law of Torts, § 26.6, p. 23 (2nd ed. 1986). Under the principle of respondeat superior, "employers are generally jointly and severally liable along with the tortfeasor employee for the torts of employees committed within the scope of employment." Dobbs, The Law of Torts, § 333, p. 905 (2000). In Georgia, the common law principle is codified in OCGA § 51-2-2: "Every person shall be liable for torts committed by his ... servant by his command or in the prosecution and within the scope of his business, whether the same are committed by negligence or voluntarily." Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782, 142 S.E. 111 (1928).

When an employee causes an injury to another, the test to determine if the employer is liable is whether the employee was acting within the scope of the employee's employment and on the business of the employer at the time of the injury. Allen Kane's Major Dodge v. Barnes,243 Ga. 776, 777, 257 S.E.2d 186 (1979). See also Wittig v. Spa Lady,182 Ga.App. 689, 356 S.E.2d 665 (1987) (where the Court of Appeals stated the test as being whether the tort occurred while the employee was within the scope of the actual transaction of the employer's business for accomplishing the ends of the employee's employment). The employer is not liable for the employee's tort if the tort was committed, "not by reason of the employment, but because of matters disconnected therewith...." Frazier v. Southern R. Co., 200 Ga. 590(2), 37 S.E.2d 774 (1946). Stated another way, if the employee was authorized to accomplish the purpose in pursuance of which the tort was committed, the employer is liable. Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Hill,136 Ga.App. 128(4), 220 S.E.2d 707 (1975).

While the question of whether or not an employee was acting within the scope of employment at the time of the tort is generally one for the jury, summary judgment for the employer is appropriate where the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom show that the employee was not engaged in furtherance of the employer's business, but was on a private enterprise of the employee's own. Jones v. Reserve Ins. Co.,149 Ga.App. 176(3), 253 S.E.2d 849 (1979). In the case at bar, Chatham was asked by a fellow employee to deliver a check issued by an entity other than Chatham's employer for initiation of phone service for an entity other than Chatham's employer. There is no evidence that Chatham's attempt to deliver the check was in furtherance of her employer's business. In fact, it appears that the opposite is true inasmuch as the delivery of the check would aid some of Chatham's fellow employees in their effort to open a business in competition with Chatham's employer. The fact that some of her fellow employees might benefit from her delivery of the check is not evidence that Chatham was on the business of her employer when she attempted to deliver the check. Without evidence that Chatham's employer's business was to assist in the set up of new law firms, the fact that the fellow employee who asked the favor of Chatham later described herself as having acted in her capacity as an employee of Chatham's employer when she made the request is not evidence that Chatham was on the business of her employer when she collided with Ms. Clark.

However willing we are to commit to the jury the solution of every question of fact, yet in the very nature of things, when the determination of the issue rests not on direct proof, but on circumstances, there exists a point where the inferences to be drawn can not, as a matter of law, be sufficient to [defeat the grant of summary judgment]. [Cit.]

Allen Kane's Major Dodge v. Barnes,243 Ga. 776, 779, 257 S.E.2d 186 (1979). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and order the reinstatement of the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Chorey Taylor.

Judgment reversed.

CHOREY, TAYLOR & FEIL, P.C. v. CLARK Case Brief

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