Bolling v. Sharpe Case Brief
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Case Brief Summary & Legal Analysis
tl;dr: Black children denied admission to a District of Columbia public school solely because of race challenged school segregation. The Court held that segregation violated the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process and restored the case to its docket for reargument on previously posed questions.
Legal Significance: The decision establishes that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits racial segregation in District of Columbia public schools, although that amendment contains no Equal Protection Clause. It recognizes that unjustifiable discrimination can violate due process without treating due process and equal protection as universally interchangeable.
Case Facts & Court Holding
Key Facts & Case Background
The petitioners were Black minors refused admission to a District of Columbia public school attended by white children solely because of their race. They alleged that school segregation deprived them of due process under the Fifth Amendment and sought admission through the District Court for the District of Columbia. That court dismissed their complaint. The Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment in the Court of Appeals because of the importance of the constitutional question.
Court Holding & Legal Precedent
Issue: Does racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia deny children the due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment?
Racial segregation in District of Columbia public schools violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Segregation bears no reasonable relationship to any proper governmental objective and therefore arbitrarily deprives Black children of liberty. Although the Fifth Amendment lacks an Equal Protection Clause, unjustifiable discrimination can violate due process.
IRAC Legal Analysis
Legal Issue
Does racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia deny children the due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment?
Conclusion
The decision establishes a Fifth Amendment basis for prohibiting racial segregation in District of Columbia public schools. It also recognizes that unjustifiable discrimination can violate due process while preserving distinctions between due process and equal protection.
Legal Rule
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits racial segregation in District of Columbia public schools because such segregation arbitrarily restricts liberty without a reasonable relationship to any proper governmental objective. Discrimination may be sufficiently unjustifiable to violate due process. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U. S. 329; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 13-14; Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 585. Classifications based solely on race require particular scrutiny. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 216; Hirabayaski v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100.
Legal Analysis
The Court distinguished the constitutional basis of this case from Brown v. Board of Education, which held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from maintaining racially segregated public schools. The Fifth Amendment applies in the District of Columbia but contains no equal protection clause. Nevertheless, equal protection and due process share a foundation in fairness, and discrimination can be so unjustifiable that it violates due process. The Court expressly declined to equate the two guarantees in every circumstance.
Citing Korematsu and Hirabayaski, the Court explained that classifications based solely on race are constitutionally suspect and require particular care. Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 591, supplied a principle against governmental racial discrimination concerning civil and political rights. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, illustrated that unreasonable racial discrimination restricting property transfers could deny due process.
The Court construed liberty as extending beyond freedom from bodily restraint to conduct individuals are free to pursue. Restrictions require a proper governmental objective. Public-school segregation lacked a reasonable relationship to any such objective and thus imposed an arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Given Brown’s prohibition on state school segregation, the Court reasoned that the Constitution could not impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government. For the reasons stated in Brown, it restored the case to the docket for reargument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded.
The Opinion
Summary
- Holding: Racial segregation in District of Columbia public schools violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
- Reasoning: The Court established “reverse incorporation,” finding that although the Fifth Amendment lacks an equal protection clause, discrimination can be so unjustifiable as to violate due process.
- Key Quote: It would be “unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government” than on the states.
Full text
Complete unedited opinion text as published by the court
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case challenges the validity of segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia. The petitioners, minors of the Negro race, allege that such segregation deprives them of due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. They were refused admission to a public school attended by white children solely because of their race. They sought the aid of the District Court for the District of Columbia in obtaining admission. That court dismissed their complaint. The Court granted a writ of certiorari before judgment in the Court of Appeals because of the importance of the constitutional question presented. 344 U. S. 873.
We have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools. 1 The legal problem in the District of Columbia is somewhat \*499 different, however. The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The “equal protection of the laws” is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than “due process of law,” and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process. 2
Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect. 3 As long ago as 1896, this Court declared the principle “that the Constitution of the United States, in its present form, forbids, so far as civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination by the General Government, or by the States, against any citizen because of his race.” 4 And in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, the Court held that a statute which limited the right of a property owner to convey his property to a person of another race was, as an unreasonable discrimination, a denial of due process of law.
Although the Court has not assumed to define “liberty” with any great precision, that term is not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint. Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a \*500 proper governmental objective. Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.
In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Eederal Government. 5 We hold that racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
For the reasons set out in Brown v. Board of Education, this case will be restored to the docket for reargument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court. 345 U. S. 972.
It is so ordered.
Brown v. Board of Education, ante, p. 483.
Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U. S. 329; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 13-14; Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 585.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 216; Hirabayaski v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100.
Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 591. Cf. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 198-199.
Cf. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24.