Case brief · Torts

BARTOLONE v. JECKOVICH Case Brief

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Fourth Department • 1984
Holding checked against the opinion
103 A.D.2d 632 Torts Civil Procedure
AI-generated from the opinion text. Read the opinion before you rely on it.

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Case Brief Summary & Legal Analysis

3 min read

tl;dr: After a collision caused minor physical injuries, plaintiff claimed it aggravated preexisting schizophrenia and permanently disabled him. The trial court set aside his $500,000 verdict unless he accepted $30,000. On plaintiff’s appeal, the appellate court reversed and reinstated the verdict, finding ample supporting evidence.

Legal Significance: The case applies the principle that defendants take plaintiffs as they find them to accident-related aggravation of preexisting psychiatric illness. Minor physical injuries do not preclude recovery for disabling psychiatric consequences when the evidence supports causation.

Case Facts & Court Holding

Key Facts & Case Background

Plaintiff was involved in a four-car chain reaction collision on October 4, 1976, for which defendants were found liable. He sustained whiplash and cervical and lower back strain, received muscle relaxants and physical therapy, and was not hospitalized. He subsequently suffered an acute psychotic breakdown from which he had not recovered.

Before the accident, plaintiff worked as a carpenter, lived alone, and devoted substantial time to bodybuilding and artistic interests. Plaintiff’s medical experts testified that physical fitness enabled him to cope with a preexisting schizophrenic illness. They explained that his perception of bodily impairment after the accident deprived him of that coping mechanism. They agreed that the accident exacerbated his illness, leaving him in an irreversible chronic paranoid schizophrenic state. Defendants’ expert, who had never examined plaintiff, agreed that he had schizophrenia but disputed aggravation by the accident.

The jury awarded plaintiff $500,000. The trial court granted defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial unless plaintiff stipulated to reduce the verdict to $30,000. Plaintiff refused and appealed.

Court Holding & Legal Precedent

Issue: Did the evidence support reinstating the jury’s $500,000 verdict for an accident’s aggravation of plaintiff’s preexisting schizophrenia despite his relatively minor physical injuries?

The court unanimously reversed the order, with costs, denied defendants’ motion, and reinstated the $500,000 verdict. Ample evidence supported the jury’s determination that the accident aggravated plaintiff’s previously quiescent schizophrenic condition and left him totally and permanently disabled.

IRAC Legal Analysis

Legal Issue

Did the evidence support reinstating the jury’s $500,000 verdict for an accident’s aggravation of plaintiff’s preexisting schizophrenia despite his relatively minor physical injuries?

Conclusion

The decision confirms that supported psychiatric aggravation claims can sustain substantial damages despite minor physical injuries. It applies the requirement that defendants take plaintiffs as they find them to preexisting schizophrenia.

Legal Rule

A defendant must take a plaintiff as he finds him and may be liable for aggravation of a preexisting illness. The possibility that the condition might have occurred without the accident does not itself defeat recovery. McCahill v New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221, 223-224; Monahan v Weichert, 82 A.D.2d 102, 108.

Legal Analysis

The trial court concluded that the jury lacked a basis for attributing plaintiff’s total mental breakdown to a minor accident. The appellate court found ample evidence supporting that connection. Plaintiff’s experts explained how his intense emotional investment in physical fitness had allowed him to function relatively normally despite underlying schizophrenia. His perceived physical deterioration after the accident disrupted that coping mechanism and precipitated lasting psychiatric deterioration. The jury also observed plaintiff and heard his testimony; defendants’ expert had never seen him.

Bonner v United States, 339 F.Supp. 640, supplied a comparable example of minor physical injuries precipitating a disabling chronic psychosis in a plaintiff with an underlying psychiatric illness. In Steinhauser v Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169, the court reversed a defense verdict because the plaintiff was entitled to jury consideration of whether an accident activated preexisting pathology into schizophrenia, even without bodily injury.

These precedents illustrated the principle, supported by McCahill v New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221, that defendants take plaintiffs as they find them and may answer for aggravating preexisting illness. Under McCahill and Monahan v Weichert, 82 A.D.2d 102, 108, the possibility that plaintiff’s condition might have developed independently did not bar recovery. The relatively minor physical injuries therefore did not justify setting aside the supported verdict.

The Opinion

Summary

  • A defendant is liable for aggravating a plaintiff’s pre-existing, latent psychological condition, even if the physical accident was minor.
  • This case is a classic application of the “eggshell plaintiff” rule: a tortfeasor must take the victim as they find them.
  • The court reinstated a $500,000 jury verdict, deferring to the jury’s finding of causation based on expert testimony.

Full text

Complete unedited opinion text as published by the court

DENMAN, J.

DENMAN, J.

On October 4, 1976, plaintiff was involved in a four-car chain reaction collision in Niagara Falls for which defendants were found liable. Plaintiff sustained relatively minor injuries consisting of whiplash and cervical and lower back strain for which he was treated with muscle relaxants and physical therapy but was not hospitalized. Subsequently, however, he suffered an acute psychotic breakdown from which he has not recovered. The theory on which plaintiff's case was tried was that the accident aggravated a preexisting paranoid schizophrenic condition which has totally and permanently disabled him. The jury returned a verdict of $500,000 in plaintiff's favor. The court granted defendants' motion to set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial unless plaintiff would stipulate to a reduced verdict of $30,000. Plaintiff refused and took this appeal. The order should be reversed and the verdict reinstated.

At the time of the accident, plaintiff was a 48-year-old man who lived alone in one room and worked out of a union hall as a carpenter. He was very proud of his physique and his strength, spending on the average of four hours daily at the local YMCA engaged in body building. On weekends, in order to conserve his strength, he pursued nonphysical interests such as painting and sculpture, singing and playing the guitar and trombone. Since the accident, plaintiff has been in a degenerative psychotic condition in which he is withdrawn, hostile, delusional, hears voices and sees shadows, refuses to cut his hair, shave or bathe and no longer participates in any of his former interests. Io the words of his treating psychiatrist, he is "a life lost".

Three psychiatrists and one neurosurgeon testified on behalf of plaintiff. From their testimony a strange and sad profile emerged: Plaintiff's mother had died of cancer when he was a very young boy. His sister had also died of cancer. Probably as a consequence, plaintiff had developed a fear and dislike of doctors and engaged in body building in order to avoid doctors and ward off illness. His bodily fitness was extremely important to him because it provided him with a sense of control over his life so that he was able to function in a relatively normal way. He had adopted a life-style in which he was something of a "loner", but he was self-supporting, had no complaints and lived a rather placid existence. After the accident, although his physical injuries were minor, he perceived that his bodily integrity was impaired and that he was physically deteriorating. Because he had such an intense emotional investment in his body, his perception of this impairment made him incapable of his former physical feats and he was thus deprived of the mechanism by which he coped with his emotional problems. As a consequence, he deteriorated psychologically and socially as well. He increasingly isolated himself and felt himself to be a victim of powerful forces over which he had no control. It was the consensus of plaintiff's medical experts that he had suffered from a preexisting schizophrenic illness which had been exacerbated by the accident and that he was now in a chronic paranoid schizophrenic state which is irreversible.

Defendants' expert, who had never seen the plaintiff, even at trial, agreed that plaintiff suffered from schizophrenia but stated that, in his opinion, it had not been exacerbated by the accident and that defendant was merely attempting to make money. The jury, who had an opportunity to see the plaintiff and hear his testimony, returned a verdict of $500,000. The court set that verdict aside stating that there was no basis on which the jury could conclude that plaintiff's total mental breakdown could be attributed to a minor accident.

We find, to the contrary, that there was ample proof in the record to support the jury's verdict. There is precedent for such determination. In Bonner v United States (339 F.Supp. 640), plaintiff was a passenger in a car which was rear-ended. She received a whiplash injury resulting in cervical spasms and lumbar-sacral strain for which she was treated with muscle relaxants and physiotherapy. She later developed numbness, headaches, hearing difficulties, inability to keep her eyes open, deteriorated personal hygiene, degeneration in appearance, facial tics and jerking and twitching of her head, all of which were determined to be of a psychological rather than neurological origin. The psychiatric testimony established that she had a preexisting underlying psychotic illness with which she was able to cope until the accident but that the accident had precipitated a chronic psychosis which was totally disabling.

In Steinhauser v Hertz Corp. (421 F.2d 1169), plaintiff, a 14-year-old girl, was riding as a passenger in a car with her parents when it was struck by another vehicle. The occupants did not suffer any bodily injuries. Within minutes after the accident, plaintiff began to behave in a bizarre manner. After a series of hospitalizations, she was diagnosed as suffering from a "schizophrenic reaction — acute — undifferentiated." The other evidence at trial was similar to the evidence in the case before us. Prior to the accident she had a "`prepsychotic' personality" and displayed a predisposition to abnormal behavior (supra, p 1171). Nevertheless, there was testimony that, had it not been for the accident, she might have been able to lead a normal life and that the accident was the precipitating cause of her psychosis. The trial court did not allow plaintiff's counsel to elicit testimony as to whether the accident could have been an aggravating cause of her condition. In reversing a verdict of no cause for action, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that the evidence made clear that plaintiff had some degree of pathology which was activated into schizophrenia by the emotional trauma connected with the accident and that she was entitled to have that issue fairly weighed by a jury.

The circumstances of those cases as well as those of the case before us illustrate the truth of the old axiom that a defendant must take a plaintiff as he finds him and hence may be held liable in damages for aggravation of a preexisting illness (see McCahill v New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221). Nor may defendants avail themselves of the argument that plaintiff should be denied recovery because his condition might have occurred even without the accident (see McCahill v New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221, 223-224, supra; see, also, Monahan v Weichert, 82 A.D.2d 102, 108).

The record presents ample evidence that plaintiff, although apparently suffering from a quiescent psychotic illness, was able to function in a relatively normal manner but that this minor accident aggravated his schizophrenic condition leaving him totally and permanently disabled.

Accordingly, the order should be reversed and the jury's verdict reinstated.

Order unanimously reversed, with costs, motion denied and verdict reinstated.